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1. Motivation 
In the wake of the EU-wide mandatory IFRS adoption for publicly-traded companies (EC, 
2002), an ever-evolving strand of research explores the benefits and costs of this substantial 
financial reporting change (see Pope and McLeay (2011) and Brown (2011) for an overview 
of early evidence). For most jurisdictions, the IFRS adoption resulted in a significant 
expansion of fair value accounting, particularly with regard to measurement of financial 
instruments under IAS 39 (e.g., Schipper, 2005). The controversial debate about this shift 
towards fair value accounting culminated during the recent financial crisis, where opponents 
claimed that fair value accounting in banks’ financial statements has aggravated the situation 
(e.g., Laux and Leuz, 2010). Taken together, these developments result in a demand for 
research that contributes to a more profound understanding of the timely and relevant issue of 
fair value accounting under IFRS and its economic consequences (Hopwood, 2009). 
In the light of the lively debate about the fair value measurement concept and its alleged role 
during the financial crisis, standards regulating fair value accounting were repeatedly 
amended in the years following the EU-wide IFRS adoption. As explained below, these 
amendments entail a fertile soil for research that aims at a differentiated understanding of the 
economic benefits and costs of fair value accounting. In June 2005, the IASB issued 
Amendments to IAS 39 Financial Instruments: Recognition and Measurement - The Fair 
Value Option (IASB, 2005). These amendments introduced certain criteria which financial 
instruments have to meet in order to be eligible for a designation as at fair value through 
profit or loss (so-called fair value option). Analyzing fair value accounting under the fair 
value option enables researchers to gain insights into the economic benefits and costs 
associated with voluntary fair value accounting. In the midst of the recent financial crisis, in 
October 2008, the IASB issued amendments to IAS 39 and IFRS 7 (IASB, 2008), which 
enable banks to abandon fair value measurement in favor of historical cost accounting by 
changing the IAS 39 classification of certain assets. Reclassifications carried out under this 
amendment provide an unparalleled natural experiment for examining the economic 
consequences of suspending fair value accounting (see also Bischof et al., 2010). As a further 
consequence of the financial crisis, in March 2009, the IASB issued another amendment to 
IFRS 7 called Improving Disclosures about Financial Instruments. Accordingly, entities have 
to disclose fair value hierarchy levels for all fair value measurements recognized in the 
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financial statements from financial year 2009 onwards (IFRS 7.27A-B and IFRS 7.44G).1 
These disclosures enhance the quantity and quality of publicly available information about 
different types of fair value measurement (Fiechter and Novotny-Farkas, 2011). Hence, this 
enables researchers to examine empirically whether and how economic benefits and costs of 
fair value accounting depend on certain types of fair value measurement.  
This thesis consists of three essays on the economic benefits and costs of fair value 
accounting in European banks’ financial reporting that address the subjects outlined above. 
All three essays present empirical analyses that build upon prior theoretical and empirical 
literature in the respective research fields. The first essay, Fair Value Option for Liabilities 
and Information Asymmetry – Evidence on the Recognition of Credit Risk Changes under 
IFRS, is co-authored with Dr. Duc Hung Tran, postdoctoral research assistant at the 
Department of Accounting at the University of Cologne. The essay focuses on voluntary fair 
value accounting for liabilities and the recognition of fair value changes that result from 
changes in banks’ own credit risk. It investigates how the adoption of the fair value option for 
liabilities and the associated recognition of own credit risk changes affect information 
asymmetry across investors. 
The second essay, Capital Market Reactions to the Reclassification of Financial Assets under 
IAS 39 – Evidence from European Banks, examines the investors’ reaction to the 
reclassifications of financial instruments under the amendment to IAS 39. The essay analyzes 
the reaction by comparing the value relevance of reclassified assets’ book values to that of 
disclosed fair values. In addition, the essay explores value relevance differences between the 
three types of reclassifications. 
The third essay, The Role of Fair Values in the Pricing of Audit Services – Evidence from 
European Banks, is based on a working paper with Dr. Duc Hung Tran.2  The essay focuses 
on costs associated with fair value accounting for financial instruments by examining its 
influence on audit fees of European banks. Among the key aspects of the study are the 
questions whether the influence differs between different fair value types as reflected in fair 
value hierarchy levels and how financial instrument reclassifications affect audit fees. 
                                                
1 For more information on the hierarchy levels see chapter 4. 
2 The first and the third essay of this thesis are based on working papers co-authored with Dr. Duc Hung Tran, 
however, the research work (idea, research design, data collection, data analysis and writing) was primarily 
carried out by myself. 
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2. Fair Value Option for Liabilities and Information Asymmetry – Evidence on the 
Recognition of Credit Risk Changes under IFRS 
2.1 Research question and design  
The essay Fair Value Option for Liabilities and Information Asymmetry – Evidence on the 
Recognition of Credit Risk Changes under IFRS explores how voluntary fair value accounting 
for liabilities affects information asymmetry across investors. In the first part of the essay, we 
investigate whether information asymmetry is lower for adopters of the fair value option for 
liabilities than for non-adopters. IAS 39.9 limits the adoption to cases where one of three 
eligibility criteria is met. Accordingly, the first two criteria allow entities to adopt the fair 
value option if it eliminates or significantly reduces an accounting mismatch or if a group of 
financial instruments is managed and performance evaluated on a fair value basis. Following 
Copeland and Galai (1983) as well as Glosten and Milgrom (1985), we argue that the 
adoption under these criteria is positively impacting the informational level of uninformed 
traders and thus decreasing information asymmetry across investors.  
In the second part of the essay, we focus on the controversial recognition of fair value 
changes that are attributable to own credit risk changes. The recognition is criticized as being 
counterintuitive because a deterioration of an entity’s own credit quality leads to a decline of 
its liabilities’ fair value which is then recognized as income statement gain (e.g., Power, 
2010).3 In the light of considerable criticism by academics as well as practitioners (e.g., ECB, 
2001; Lipe, 2002; Heckman, 2004) and experimental research documenting that investors 
misinterpret the counterintuitive recognition of credit risk fair value changes (Lachmann et 
al., 2010; Gaynor et al., 2011), we examine its incremental effect on information asymmetry. 
To this end, we address the question whether a potential reduction in information asymmetry 
that results from the adoption of the fair value option is countervailed by the recognition of 
credit risk changes. 
Consistent with prior research (e.g., Leuz, 2003), we employ observable bid-ask spreads as 
our information asymmetry measure. Controlling for inventory-holding and order-processing 
costs enables us to isolate the information asymmetry component of the spreads (Stoll, 1978). 
Spanning the period 2006-2010, our primary sample consists of 108 listed banks from 25 
                                                
3 Vice versa for an improving credit quality. 
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European countries. First, we test for information asymmetry differences between adopters 
and non-adopters by comparing their bid-ask spreads. Subsequently, we hold the control-
group of non-adopters constant while reducing the treatment group to adopters with credit risk 
fair value changes. Finally, we compare the latter group to adopters without such changes. We 
address endogeneity concerns by excluding banks that we classify as lacking eligibility for the 
fair value option adoption and additionally by using a two-stage treatment effects model. The 
data used for the analyses are partly hand-collected from the 2006-2010 annual reports and 
partly obtained from commercial databases (Worldscope, Datastream, and I/B/E/S). 
2.2 Results and contribution to the literature  
The results of our analyses document that information asymmetry levels are lower for 
adopters than for non-adopters, as reflected in smaller bid-ask spreads. Next, we find that bid-
ask spreads are still significantly smaller for adopters with credit risk fair value changes 
compared to non-adopters. Finally, the results indicate that information asymmetry levels are 
lower for adopters with credit risk changes relative to adopters without such changes. In 
summary, our results show that the adoption of the IAS 39 fair value option is effective in 
reducing information asymmetry and we do not find evidence that recognizing own credit risk 
fair value changes does countervail this reduction. Thus, the results do not support claims that 
investors perceive the recognition as being detrimental to financial reporting quality. 
The essay mainly contributes to two strands of literature. Firstly, it adds to the extant research 
on the effects of fair value accounting on information asymmetry (e.g., Muller and Riedl, 
2002; Bischof et al., 2010; Ball et al., 2012). Secondly, using a capital market-based measure 
of information asymmetry, the essay makes a distinct contribution to the literature on the 
investors’ perception of fair value accounting for liabilities. With the exception of concurrent 
research by Ball et al. (2012),4 previous studies in this area employ either a value relevance 
approach (Song, 2008; Fiechter and Novotny-Farkas, 2011) or experimental settings 
(Lachmann et al., 2010; Koonce et al., 2011; Gaynor et al., 2011) to capture the investors’ 
perception. 
                                                
4 For more information regarding differences and similarities between the two studies see chapter 2. 
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3. Capital Market Reactions to the Reclassification of Financial Assets under IAS 39 – 
Evidence from European Banks 
3.1 Research question and design 
The essay Capital Market Reactions to the Reclassification of Financial Assets under IAS 39 
– Evidence from European Banks investigates how investors reacted to financial instruments 
reclassifications carried out by European banks under the amendment to IAS 39. In October 
2008, the IASB and the European Commission issued and endorsed this amendment (IASB, 
2008), which enables banks to abandon fair value measurement in favor of historical cost 
accounting by changing the IAS 39 financial instrument classification of certain assets, e.g. 
from the held-for-trading category into the loans and receivables category. 
The study employs a value relevance approach based on the modified Ohlson (1995) model to 
analyze the investors’ reaction. First, I compare the relative value relevance of reclassified 
assets’ book and fair values by examining whether on measure possesses a higher power in 
explaining equity market values than the other. The results of previous studies document that 
banks used the reclassifications for earnings and capital management purposes (e.g., Bischof 
et al., 2010; Kholmy and Ernstberger, 2010; Fiechter, 2011), which might be detrimental to 
investors’ confidence in recognized accounting values, i.e. book values of reclassified assets. 
Thus, the value relevance of these book values decreases because investors perceive them as 
less reliable. On the other hand, a main motive for abandoning fair value measurement in 
favor of historical cost accounting was the lack of prices from functioning markets (e.g., EBF, 
2008; Véron, 2008, Dobler and Kuhner, 2009). Accordingly, fair values were either derived 
from distorted market prices or entirely determined on the basis of internal valuation models, 
which are subject to high levels of management discretion (e.g., Véron, 2008; Barth and 
Landsman, 2010). Prior research shows that the value relevance of fair values decreases with 
an increasing exposure to discretion (e.g., Nelson, 1996; Park et al., 1999; Khurana and Kim, 
2003; Goh et al., 2009; Kolev, 2009), which leads to the expectation that book values of 
reclassified assets possess a higher value relevance compared to disclosed fair values.  
Next, I address the question whether differences in the explanatory power of book and fair 
values depend on the type of reclassification. I motivate this question by arguing that 
reclassifications represent accounting choices through which management is able to convey 
private information (Holthausen and Leftwich, 1983). The peculiarities of the different types 
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of reclassification affect the credibility of the private information. More credible information, 
in turn, mitigates reliability concerns that arise from the reclassifications’ earnings 
management implications and thus increase value relevance.  
In the following part of the essay, I employ an incremental value relevance approach to 
analyze whether disclosed fair values possess value relevance beyond that of book values. 
Under this approach, I hypothesize that although fair values might possess lower explanatory 
power relative to book values, investors still factor fair and book value differences into their 
pricing, especially because of the earnings management implications that become visible in 
these differences. Consequentially, reclassified assets’ fair values are incrementally value 
relevant. Finally, I compare investors’ pricing of reclassified instruments’ book values and 
predict that the pricing differs between the types of reclassification.  
The sample used in the study consists of 56 listed banks that originate from 19 European 
countries. The reclassified assets’ book and fair values are hand-collected from these banks’ 
quarterly and annual reports (Q3 2008 – Q1 2010), other data for the empirical analyses are 
obtained from commercial databases (Worldscope and Datastream).  
3.2 Results and contribution to the literature 
The results of the relative value relevance study indicate that book values of reclassified 
assets possess a higher power in explaining equity market values in comparison to fair values. 
Accordingly, investors do not regard the reclassifications as mere earnings management but 
as an adequate means to abandon distorted fair values. Furthermore, I find that the higher 
explanatory power of book values is mainly driven by the reclassifications from the held-for-
trading into the held-to-maturity category. I attribute this finding to peculiarities of this type 
of reclassification, e.g. the IAS 39.9 tainting rules for the held-to-maturity category, which 
positively affect the credibility of the information conveyed through the reclassification. The 
incremental value relevance study reveals that fair value disclosures are only value relevant to 
investors for reclassifications from held-for-trading into held-to-maturity. The direction of the 
investors’ pricing adjustment reinforces the notion that they react positively to the 
reclassifications. The lack of incremental value relevance of disclosed fair values for the other 
types of reclassification indicates that investors seem to disregard fair values because they 
originate from malfunctioning markets and/or unreliable management estimations. Regarding 
the pricing of book values, I find that investors price assets reclassified from held-for-trading 
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into loans-and-receivables lowest showing that book values resulting from this reclassification 
are perceived as least reliable.  
Taken together, the results document that investors reacted favorably to the reclassifications 
in spite of the associated earnings management. Hence, I conclude that financial statement 
preparers were able to convey private information through the reclassifications, whereas rules 
penalizing opportunistic behavior seem to positively affect the perceived reliability of this 
information. This essay contributes to the extant literature on value relevance of fair values 
(e.g., Khurana and Kim, 2003; Song et al., 2010) and on economic consequences of the 
reclassifications under the IAS 39 amendment (e.g., Fiechter and Novotny-Farkas, 2011). 
Notably, I add to this literature by showing that the type of reclassification exhibits an 
influence on the investors’ reaction. In a more broader sense, this essay further contributes to 
the empirical research on accounting choice (Fields et al., 2001). 
4. The Role of Fair Values in the Pricing of Audit Services – Evidence from European 
Banks 
4.1 Research question and design  
The essay The Role of Fair Values in the Pricing of Audit Services – Evidence from European 
Banks examines the determinants of audit fees for IFRS reporting banks. More specifically, it 
focuses on the question whether and to what extent audit fees are determined by the exposure 
to fair value accounting. The essay sheds light on costs associated with fair value accounting 
since audit fees represent agency costs in the form of monitoring costs shareholders have to 
bear (Jensen and Meckling, 1976). 
We first build a base model to capture general and bank-specific determinants of banks’ audit 
fees. To the best of our knowledge, we conduct the first and, thus far, only study on the 
determinants of IFRS reporting banks’ audit fees. Therefore, we follow Fields et al. (2004) 
and adjust their US banking sector model to reflect the institutional environment and data 
specifics of our sample. 
In the next part, the study analyzes whether the fair value exposure of banks exhibits an 
influence on audit fees. To this end, we define two alternative measures of this exposure: (1) 
The number of different IAS 39 fair value instrument categories used by a bank and (2) the 
proportion of fair value assets and liabilities to total assets. While we are not aware of other 
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studies that use the number of categories as measure of fair value exposure, prior literature 
provides mixed results regarding the influence of relative fair value amounts on audit fees 
(Chen et al., 2010; Ettredge et al., 2011; Goncharov et al., 2013).  
We then isolate effects of different fair value types: Firstly, we partition the relative amount 
of fair value instruments according to the three levels of the IAS 39 fair value hierarchy, and 
secondly, according to the financial instruments categories. The influence on audit fees is 
hypothesized to differ between the hierarchy levels due to decreasing verifiability and 
increasing complexity from level one to three (e.g., Hitz, 2005; Ettredge et al., 2011; 
Goncharov et al., 2013). We expect the peculiarities of the different financial instrument 
categories, e.g. higher turnover rates for held-for-trading financial instruments, to affect audit 
fees. Finally, we examine whether financial instrument reclassifications carried out under the 
IAS 39 amendment exhibit an influence on audit fees. 
Our dataset consists of mostly hand-collected data from the 2009 and 2010 annual reports of 
114 listed banks that originate from 21 European countries. In addition to hand-collected data, 
other data are obtained from commercial databases (Worldscope, Datastream and Reuters 
CreditViews). 
4.2 Results and contribution to the literature 
The results of the base model estimation indicate that audit fees are significantly influenced 
by variables controlling for banks’ size, general risk, complexity and non-audit fees, whereas 
more bank-specific risk variables, e.g. credit risk, seem to be of minor importance to auditors 
when pricing their services. Next, our evidence consistently shows that audit fees increase 
with an increasing number of IAS 39 fair value instrument categories. In contrast, our 
findings do not indicate that the relative volume of fair value assets and liabilities exhibits an 
influence on audit fees. Consistent with prior research (Chen et al., 2010; Ettredge et al., 
2011, Goncharov et al., 2013), we find evidence that audit fees increase with the exposure to 
less reliable and more complex level 3 fair value assets and liabilities. Furthermore, our 
results do not indicate that the IAS 39 fair value financial instrument categories exhibit 
differences in their influence on audit fees. Finally, the comparison of reclassifying and non-
reclassifying banks documents significantly higher audit fees for the former group. We 
attribute this finding to earnings management associated with the reclassifications (e.g., 
Fiechter, 2011) and incremental audit effort due to a lack of experience and additional 
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disclosures requirements for reclassified assets (IFRS 7.12A). Taken together, our results 
suggest that fair value accounting is not associated per se with higher audit fees. Instead, a 
more differentiated view reveals that certain fair value types, i.e. level 3 fair values, and the 
suspension of fair value recognition by financial instrument reclassifications exhibit an 
influence on audit fees. 
In the light of the recent financial crisis and related regulating proposals that potentially affect 
audit fees in the European Union (EC, 2010), this essay, presenting empirical evidence on the 
determinants of audit fees for European IFRS reporting banks, provides insights into the 
pricing of audit services valuable to regulators, practitioners and researchers. Furthermore, 
our essay contributes to the research on the audit fee costs associated with fair value 
measurement (Chen et al., 2010; Ettredge et al., 2011, Goncharov et al., 2013) and 
complements the second essay of this thesis by adding evidence on the economic 
consequences of financial instrument reclassifications under the IAS 39 amendment. 
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Fair Value Option for Liabilities and Information Asymmetry – Evidence on the 
Recognition of Credit Risk Changes under IFRS 
 
This paper investigates whether the fair value option for liabilities (FVO) under IAS 39 
is effective in reducing information asymmetry across investors as reflected in smaller 
bid-ask spreads. Using a sample of European banks for the years 2006 until 2010, our 
evidence consistently shows that the FVO for liabilities mitigates information 
asymmetries since FVO-adopters exhibit lower bid-ask spreads, relative to non-
adopters. We next find that the decrease in bid-ask spreads is still present when the 
control group of non-adopters is held constant while the treatment group is reduced to 
adopters that recognize fair value changes attributable to own credit risk changes. 
Moreover, the comparison of adopters with own credit risk fair value changes to other 
adopters reinforces the notion that recognizing these fair values does not countervail the 
reduction in information asymmetry attained by the adoption of the FVO. Taken 
together, our findings do not support claims that recognizing fair value changes 
attributable to changes in the own credit risk is detrimental to the transparency of 
financial statements. 
 
Keywords: Fair value option, credit risk, financial instruments, IAS 39 
JEL Classification: G14, G21, M41
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1. Introduction 
In the context of the ongoing discussion on fair value accounting for liabilities, the so-
called counterintuitive effect represents the most heavily debated aspect. The 
counterintuitivity, or income statement anomaly, arises from the following mechanism: 
When an entity’s credit quality deteriorates, the liabilities’ fair value decreases which is 
subsequently recognized as income statement gain (e.g., Power, 2010).1 
Consequentially, the profitability as well as the debt ratio improve. The potential 
magnitude of this effect can be exemplified by the 2008 financial statements of the 
HSBC Group. They include a gain of US $ 6.5 bn that was recognized due to HSBC 
Group’s worsening credit quality which led to decreasing values for liabilities 
accounted for under the fair value option (FVO). This gain makes up approximately 70 
percent of the total profit before tax of US $ 9.3 bn in 2008 (HSBC Holdings plc, 2008). 
Opponents of the described mechanism criticize its outcomes as being misleading and 
potentially masking a worsening situation regarding the entity’s financial health, 
thereby increasing information asymmetries across investors (e.g., ECB, 2001; 
Heckman, 2004). Competing views in the literature argue that a more distorted picture 
results when the same factors that actually lead to changing asset values are disregarded 
in the valuation of economically related financial liabilities. If assets are measured at 
fair value, while liabilities do not incorporate changes in credit risk, the profit or loss 
amounts will be distorted by this inconsistency. Also practitioners explicitly motivate 
the use of the FVO as follows: “The bonds subscribed by the Group and mortgage 
bonds issued are classified in the category of Other financial assets at fair value 
through profit or loss and Other financial liabilities at fair value through profit and loss 
respectively, to avoid information asymmetries” (Banco Pastor Group, 2011, p. 76).  
Set against this backdrop, this paper provides empirical evidence on the question 
whether the application of the FVO for liabilities and the related accounting for credit 
risk changes under IAS 39 are effective in reducing information asymmetries across 
investors. We expect the FVO to have positive implications on information asymmetry 
because of the eligibility criteria according to IAS 39.9. These limit the FVO adoption 
to certain circumstances: The first criterion states that the FVO can be adopted if it 
                                                
1 When the entity’s credit quality improves this mechanism works vice versa. 
21 
eliminates or significantly reduces an accounting mismatch. Such an elimination or 
reduction should increase the reporting quality and therefore decrease measurement 
error of investors. According to the second eligibility criterion, the FVO can also be 
adopted for a group of financial instruments that is managed and performance evaluated 
on a fair value basis. An adoption based on this criterion should also increase reporting 
quality by reflecting the actual investment or risk management strategy. Those two 
positive implications on information asymmetry lead to our first hypothesis, that 
information asymmetry is lower for adopters relative to non-adopters.  
We focus on the liabilities side since the main interest of our study is to disentangle the 
incremental effect on information asymmetry induced by the counterintuitive 
recognition of own credit risk changes which only occurs on the liabilities side of the 
balance sheet. We disentangle this effect by analyzing whether the reduction in 
information asymmetry attained through the FVO adoption is countervailed by the 
recognition of fair value changes that result from changes in the own credit risk. Such a 
recognition might be detrimental to information asymmetry since it potentially leads to 
diverging opinions among investors: Some might view it as being misleading and adjust 
the income for this effect, some might agree with, while some might not even detect it.  
Using a European sample of IFRS reporting banks over the period 2006 to 2010, we 
employ observed bid-ask spreads as our dependent variable. Building upon prior 
finance literature (e.g., Stoll, 1978), we isolate the component in the bid-ask spread 
attributable to information asymmetry by including control variables for inventory-
holding and order-processing costs. This measure thus enables us to evaluate 
differences in information asymmetry among investors, i.e. the implications of the FVO 
on the information environment. Our analysis proceeds in two steps. First, we 
investigate whether bid-ask spreads are lower for adopters of the FVO for liabilities 
than for non-adopters. Our results show consistent evidence for lower levels of 
information asymmetry for adopters. The results are robust when we control for 
endogeneity bias by excluding banks that are viewed as lacking eligibility to adopt the 
FVO and when we additionally use treatment effects models. Also, the exclusion of the 
financial crisis years 2008 and 2009 does not affect our results qualitatively. 
Second, we find that the decrease in bid-ask spreads is still present when the control 
group of non-adopters is held constant while the treatment group is reduced to adopters 
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that recognize fair value changes attributable to changes in credit risk. Again, sample 
alterations and controls for endogeneity bias reinforce the robustness of the results. 
Finally, the comparison of adopters with credit risk fair value changes to adopters 
without such changes reveals systematic differences in the bid-ask spreads in favor of 
the former group. Our findings suggest that the FVO for liabilities is perceived 
favorably by investors and it is effective in reducing information asymmetries. 
Furthermore, and contrary to findings gained from experimental settings (Lachmann et 
al., 2010; Gaynor et al., 2011), our results do not support claims that recognizing fair 
value changes attributable to changes in the credit risk is detrimental to the transparency 
of financial statements. 
Our paper makes several contributions to the extant literature regarding investors’ 
perception of the recognition of liabilities’ fair value changes, in particular those evoked 
by credit risk changes. Prior literature explores the perception by following two 
approaches: One approach tests the value relevance of liabilities measured at fair value, 
whereby lower reliability is supposed to be driven by higher degrees of information 
asymmetry and measurement error (Song, 2008; Fiechter and Novotny-Farkas, 2011). 
We extend this stream of literature by using a more direct measure of information 
asymmetry. A second approach implements experimental settings where CPAs or 
(MBA) students serve as participants (Lachmann et al., 2010; Koonce et al., 2011; 
Gaynor et al., 2011). However, the specific choice of participants might limit the extent 
to which the results of these studies are generalizable. In turn, this paper adds to this 
stream of literature by analyzing capital market data. Our study of financial liabilities 
also complements the literature on the effects of non-financial assets’ fair values on 
information asymmetry (Muller and Riedl, 2002; Muller et al., 2011). Finally, in a 
broader sense, we contribute to the current debate (e.g., van Zijl and Whittington, 2006; 
Horton et al., 2011; Nobes, 2011) whether fair values or other approaches should be 
applied in the measurement of contract liabilities by providing evidence on the 
information asymmetry implications of the FVO.  
We note that there is one contemporaneous and independent capital market based study 
related to ours: Ball et al. (2012) use a sample of US banks and find, contrary to our 
results, that adopters of the SFAS 159 FVO for assets and liabilities experience an 
increase in bid-ask spreads relative to non-adopters. We attribute this divergence of 
results to differences in the design of the FVO under IFRS and US GAAP, since, unlike 
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IAS 39, the adoption of the SFAS 159 FVO is not subject to any eligibility criteria. We 
therefore regard the findings from Ball et al. (2012) as further support to our hypothesis 
that the IAS 39 eligibility criteria are the main drivers of an information asymmetry 
reduction attained through the FVO. Also, Ball et al. (2012) do not specifically focus on 
liabilities’ fair value changes triggered by credit risk changes. To the best of our 
knowledge, this is the first paper providing capital market based evidence on the 
perception of these particular fair value changes across market participants in an 
international IFRS setting.  
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 summarizes the fair value 
option for liabilities and the role of credit risk changes under IFRS and presents the 
related discussion in the literature. The following Section 3 provides an overview of the 
related literature and develops the hypotheses. Section 4 elaborates on the research 
design and describes the sample. The results of the empirical analysis are presented in 
Section 5. Finally, Section 6 concludes. 
2. Institutional background and general discussion 
2.1 Fair value option and own credit risk according to IAS 39 and IFRS 9 
In 2003, the IASB issued an amendment to IAS 39 that introduced the option to 
irrevocably designate any financial instruments at fair value through profit or loss. 
However, due to concerns raised by several institutions (e.g., Basel Committee on 
Banking Supervision, 2002) the current version of IAS 39, which has been effective for 
financial years beginning on or after 1 January 2006, was altered to the effect that the 
application of the FVO is tied to three eligibility criteria.2 Accordingly, an entity is 
eligible to designate a financial liability at fair value through profit or loss if one of the 
following three criteria is met: 3 (1) The designation eliminates or significantly reduces a 
measurement or recognition inconsistency (so-called accounting mismatch), (2) a group 
of financial instruments is managed and its performance is evaluated on a fair value 
basis, in accordance with a documented risk management or investment strategy, and 
(3) a financial liability belongs to a contract that contains one or more substantive 
                                                
2 In most EU jurisdictions all unrealized gains and losses resulting from the application of the FVO are 
fully reflected in the regulatory capital (Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, 2006; CEBS, 2007) 
with the exception of gains and losses attributable to changes in own credit risk. According to article 
64(4) of Directive 2006/48/EC credit institutions shall not include these gains and losses in own funds. 
3 See IAS 39.9. 
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embedded derivatives. While US GAAP SFAS 159 contains a similar option to 
designate financial assets and liabilities at fair value through profit or loss, here, in order 
to avoid an increase in the standards’ complexity, the US Financial Accounting 
Standards Board (FASB, 2007) abstained from incorporating any eligibility criteria 
(SFAS 159.A21). Moreover, in the FASB’s view, eligibility criteria are detrimental to 
the flexibility of the FVO and therefore “hinder entities’ ability to mitigate accounting 
mismatches through the use of a flexible and easy-to-implement fair value option.” 
(SFAS 159.A21). However, several voices argue for the application of scope limitations 
similar to the eligibility criteria under IAS 39 (e.g., American Accounting Association’s 
Financial Accounting Standards Committee, 2007). 
Once a financial liability is designated as at fair value through profit or loss, all fair 
value changes, including those attributable to changes in the credit risk, have to be 
recognized in the income statement. IFRS 7.10a requires an entity to disclose the 
liabilities’ fair value change, during the period and cumulatively, that is attributable to 
changes in the credit risk. According to IFRS 9 Financial Instruments, which is 
designated to replace IAS 39 in the year 2015, the conditions that have to be met in 
order to irrevocably designate a financial liability as measured at fair value through 
profit or loss are consistent with the latter standard.4 However, as a reaction to the 
debate on the counterintuitive effect, the IASB modified the treatment of fair value 
changes: For FVO liabilities the amount of change in the fair value attributable to 
changes in the credit risk is directly recognized in equity via the other comprehensive 
income.5 However, if the recognition in the other comprehensive income would create 
or increase an accounting mismatch, the entire amount of change is still recognized in 
the income statement.6 
 
 
                                                
4 See IFRS 9.4.2.2. 
5 See IFRS 9.5.7.7 ff. 
6 See IFRS 9.5.7.8. The rationale behind this approach lies in the IASB’s (2010) view that the recognition 
of effects that stem from the credit risk of a fair value option liability does not provide useful information 
unless it prevents or decreases an accounting mismatch. According to IFRS 9.B5.7.9 the accumulated 
effects attributable to changes in the credit risk that were directly recognized in equity are not to be 
recycled.  
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2.2 Fair value option for liabilities and own credit risk: General discussion 
In the staff paper accompanying the discussion paper Credit Risk in Liability 
Measurement by the IASB (2009), Wayne Upton Jr. provides a summary of the debate 
about fair value measurement for liabilities. The main point of criticism concerns the 
financial reporting implications of recognizing changes in debt value due to changes in 
the firm’s own credit risk. When liabilities are measured at fair value, a deterioration of 
a company’s credit risk leads to an income statement gain and vice versa.  
Proponents argue that this incorporation of credit risk changes helps to avoid accounting 
mismatches. Accounting mismatch means that due to diverging measurement of 
economically related assets and liabilities, the financial statements provide a distorted 
view of the profit or loss amounts which does not reflect the actual profitability (IAS 
39.AG4D). Defining equity as a put option, Merton (1974) concludes that an increase in 
the credit risk is accompanied by a wealth transfer from debt- to shareholders. 
Accordingly, such a wealth transfer should be presented in the entity’s accounts (Barth 
and Landsman, 1995; Chasteen and Ransom, 2007; Barth et al., 2008).7 Barth and 
Landsman (2010) point out that recognizing fair value changes that arise from credit 
risk changes in the regulatory capital has the potential to mitigate regulatory capital 
procyclicality, especially during crisis periods. Finally, another argument for the 
incorporation of credit risk states that it is inconsistent to incorporate credit risk when 
determining the fair value at initial recognition but then disregard it subsequently 
(IASB, 2009). 
Opponents on the other hand label the income statement effect that results from the 
incorporation of credit risk as counterintuitive because financial statement users could 
misinterpret gains as positive signals and losses as negative signals regarding the 
entity’s financial health (e.g., ECB, 2001; Heckman, 2004). Lipe (2002) illustrates the 
misleading effects of recognizing fair value changes that are attributable to credit risk 
changes in his case study analysis of the US restaurant chain Boston Chicken.8 From an 
investor’s point of view, the distinction between fair value changes attributable to a 
changing credit risk and other fair value changes is fundamental. A decrease in a 
                                                
7 See also Heckman (2004) who argues that the option is an asset that belongs on the balance sheet of the 
owners and not of the entity. 
8 See also Barth et al. (2008) who criticize that the inferences drawn in Lipe (2002) mainly stem from 
incomplete recognition of changes in asset values rather than from fair value measurement of liabilities. 
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liability’s fair value caused by increasing market interest rates is viewed as being 
advantageous for the entity’s shareholders, although the effect will reverse as the 
liability matures. Also, shareholders appreciate a decrease of a liability’s estimated cash 
flow if it is not caused by the entity’s worsening credit quality. On the contrary, a fading 
financial strength leading to lower fair values is generally not in the interest of 
shareholders (IASB, 2009). Furthermore, critics argue that in the majority of cases, an 
entity will not be able to realize the gain from the liability’s decreasing fair value by 
transferring it. This might be due to the liability’s contractual terms or simply to a lack 
of financial means (Heckman, 2004). Finally, opponents object that the inclusion of 
credit risk changes leads to an increase of accounting mismatches (American 
Accounting Association’s Financial Accounting Standards Committee, 2007). This 
notion stems from the fact that the deterioration of an entity’s credit quality is 
oftentimes caused by an impairment of assets which also are not recognized at fair 
value, e.g. fixed assets, or not recognized on the balance sheet at all, e.g., goodwill 
(Nissim and Penman, 2008). 
3. Related literature and hypotheses development 
3.1 Related literature 
According to Demsetz (1968), the bid-ask spread results from bid and ask prices set by 
a market maker willing to immediately buy or sell a security upon receipt of an order. 
The provision of these services depends on certain levels of compensation required by 
the market maker. Theoretical research by Stoll (1978) documents that the bid-ask 
spread comprises of three cost components: information asymmetry, inventory-holding, 
and order-processing costs, where the first cost component is the primary interest of our 
study. In their market microstructure models, Copeland and Galai (1983) as well as 
Glosten and Milgrom (1985) assume the presence of traders with superior information. 
The market maker knows that he always loses when he trades with informed traders and 
thus imposes an adverse selection cost in the bid-ask spread. Hence, the spreads reflect 
a balancing of gains from trading with uninformed traders and potential losses incurred 
from trading with informed traders. Copeland and Galai (1983) show that a decrease in 
the percentage of informed traders leads to lower bid-ask spreads. We contribute to this 
stream of literature by examining whether the FVO is associated with a change in 
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information levels between the market maker and the different types of traders that 
leads to lower information asymmetries, as reflected in lower bid-ask-spreads.  
Turning to empirical studies, the extant literature provides limited direct evidence on the 
impact of the FVO for liabilities on information asymmetry. Thus, the literature review 
focuses on inferences drawn from earnings management studies regarding banks’ 
utilization of the FVO, which are then complemented by value relevance studies and 
experimental settings that capture the investors’ perception. 
Guthrie et al. (2011) investigate whether US S&P firms use the SFAS 159 FVO for 
assets and liabilities to systematically manage their earnings in the 2007 and 2008 
financial statements. The authors define firms as current earnings managing firms if 
they met or beat analysts forecast only by adopting the FVO. Future earnings managing 
firms are defined as those that use the FVO to recognize prior unrealized losses and 
thereby avoid recognition when the instruments are sold. However, the analysis does 
provide only negligible evidence that the adoption of the FVO is associated with any 
type of earnings management. Focusing on the same two years, the findings of Chang et 
al. (2009) also do not indicate that regular adopters made use of the SFAS 159 FVO for 
earnings management purposes. Rather, the authors show that banks with high values 
for variables that measure ineffective accounting hedging or accounting mismatches are 
more prone to adopt the option, suggesting that the option is used as intended by the 
standard. The same can be inferred from the results of Fiechter’s (2011) analysis of 
international banks. Fiechter (2011) shows that banks electing the FVO to reduce 
accounting mismatches under IAS 39 exhibit lower earnings volatility than their peers. 
Contrary to the results of the cited studies, Song (2008) identifies earnings management 
as well as portfolio restructuring as motives for the FVO adoption under SFAS 159. 
Furthermore, Song (2008) employs a value relevance approach based on return model 
specifications to analyze investors’ perception. The findings suggest that banks’ 
unrealized fair value option losses are priced by investors whereas unrealized gains are 
not, raising doubts about investors perceiving the FVO adoption favorably.9 Using an 
international sample of banks for the years 2006 until 2008, Fiechter and Novotny-
                                                
9 Song (2008) examines FVO assets’ and liabilities’ income statement effects as one netted position, 
resulting in either a gain or a loss. 
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Farkas (2011) do not find significant differences between the investors’ pricing of 
trading liabilities and liabilities designated at fair value. This leads to the conclusion 
that investors perceive the adoption of the FVO as being conform with the standards 
intention, i.e. the reduction of accounting mismatches, rather than as being of an 
opportunistic nature.  
In their experiment with MBA students Koonce et al. (2011) find that the value 
relevance of fair values for held-to-maturity financial liabilities is lower than for assets 
that possess exactly the same characteristics. Moreover, the same holds for fair value 
gains or losses which are due to interest rate changes. The authors trace their results 
back to a judgment bias, i.e. investors base their assessment on how easy an entry or 
exit option for the financial instrument can be accomplished and not on the underlying 
economic characteristics of said financial instrument. In their settings Lachmann et al. 
(2010) and Gaynor et al. (2011) put more emphasis on the effect that results from 
changes in the company’s own credit risk. They use CPAs and students, respectively, as 
participants and their experiments show that a gain (loss) resulting from a deteriorating 
(improving) credit quality is indeed misinterpreted as a credit quality improvement 
(deterioration). However, the results of Gaynor et al. (2011) also suggest that additional 
disclosures highlighting the interrelation are able to significantly reduce this 
misinterpretation. 
Analyzing a sample of US banks, Ball et al. (2012) find that the SFAS 159 FVO for 
assets and liabilities is associated with an increase of information asymmetry as 
adopters experience an increase in bid-ask spreads relative to non-adopters. They argue 
that the introduction of mark-to-market accounting through the adoption of the FVO for 
assets and liabilities increases information asymmetry compared to the alternative of 
historical cost accounting. When interpreting the results in the light of our study it is 
especially worthwhile to highlight the lack of eligibility criteria under SFAS 159, which 
presents another possible explanation for the information asymmetry increase. Without 
the eligibility criteria the FVO use is subject to a higher degree of discretion leaving 
more room for judgment by managers and decreasing verifiability. This reduces 
consensus about measurements among preparers, auditors, and other capital market 
participants (Schipper, 2003).  
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3.2 Hypotheses development 
As specified above, the first eligibility criterion allows the adoption of the FVO if it 
eliminates or significantly reduces an accounting mismatch that would otherwise result 
from applying different measurement concepts to economically related assets and 
liabilities. Eliminating or reducing accounting mismatches should in turn increase the 
reporting quality which leads to decreasing measurement error of investors that are 
assessing the entity’s value based on this information. Consequentially, the FVO 
adoption decreases the informational disadvantage of uninformed investors and thereby 
the information asymmetry across investors. Under the terms of the second eligibility 
criterion, the FVO can be adopted for a group of financial instruments that is managed 
and performance evaluated on a fair value basis, in accordance with a documented risk 
management or investment strategy. According to IAS39.AG4H, the measurement at 
fair value through profit or loss results in these instances per se in more relevant 
information (Barth and Landsman, 1995; Barth, 2007).10 An adoption based on the 
second criterion is therefore supposed to improve the level of informativeness by 
reflecting the actual investment strategy.11 Again, this should decrease measurement 
error of investors, have a positive impact on the informational level of uninformed 
traders and therefore reduce information asymmetry.12  
Alternatively, it might be hypothesized that this type of public disclosure leads to 
increased acquisition of private information by informed investors which adds to their 
informational advantage (e.g., Kim and Verrecchia, 1991). Ball et al. (2012) follow this 
line of argumentation by specifying that mark-to-market accounting accelerates the 
release of public information about the value of the bank’s financial instruments which 
in turn stimulates informed traders to invest more in private information and 
consequentially increases information asymmetry. The same can be inferred from the 
adoption of the FVO under the first and the second eligibility criteria: Not only 
disclosures about the value of financial instruments become public but also relevant 
                                                
10 The entity here also signalizes that the risk of the portfolio is managed by macro hedging techniques 
that comprise hedging the net position on a portfolio of assets and liabilities (Whittington, 2005). 
11 In his literature review, Landsman (2007) concludes that the existing overall research findings suggest 
that fair values are more informative to investors.  
12 In our analysis we do not regard banks that made use of the FVO under the first, the second or both 
criteria separately due to rather scarce disclosures regarding this matter. However, this does not affect the 
appropriateness of our research design since we expect both criteria to exhibit a positive impact on 
information asymmetry.  
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information about their economic relationship with other assets or liabilities (first 
criterion) and about how they are accounted for in the bank’s risk management or 
investment strategy (second criterion).13 
Furthermore, market participants might be suspicious about managers using the FVO 
for earnings management or portfolio restructuring purposes, which is likely to have a 
detrimental effect on information asymmetry since uninformed traders are at a 
informational disadvantage in detecting these practices (Ball et al., 2012). However, as 
elaborated in more detail above, with the exception of Song (2008), the prevailing 
empirical findings (Chang et al., 2009; Guthrie et al., 2011) indicate that the FVO is not 
used to manage earnings but as intended by the standard. Assuming that investors’ 
perception is in line with these findings,14 we put the emphasis on the positive 
implications on information asymmetry induced by the adoption under the two 
eligibility criteria. According to the frameworks of Copeland and Galai (1983) and 
Glosten and Milgrom (1985), we expect that the FVO adoption leads to a lower 
percentage of informed traders and an improved information level of the market maker. 
The market maker thus imposes lower adverse selection costs in the bid-ask spread, 
resulting in lower bid-ask spreads. In sum, we therefore state the following hypothesis 
(in the alternative): 
H1: Information asymmetry is lower for adopters of the fair value option for 
liabilities relative to non-adopters. 
We exclusively regard the fair value option adopted for liabilities since we subsequently 
intend to disentangle the incremental effect on information asymmetry induced by own 
credit risk fair value changes which solely occur on the liabilities side. Considering the 
substantial criticism of the incorporation of credit risk changes in the fair value 
measurement for liabilities, which is mainly due to the counterintuitive effect arising 
from this incorporation (ECB, 2001; Lipe, 2002; Heckman, 2004), it is highly 
                                                
13 Moreover, Ball et al. (2012) expect the adoption of the FVO to be detrimental to the quality and 
quantity of management forecasts since gains and losses from mark-to-market accounting are difficult to 
forecast which increases the informational disadvantage of uninformed traders. We argue that the increase 
in reporting quality attained through the adoption according to the eligibility criteria under IFRS, which 
are nonexistent under U.S. GAAP, outweighs the presumed negative effects on forecasting. 
14 The results of Fiechter and Novotny-Farkas (2011) regarding the pricing of FVO liabilities lend support 
to this assumption. Since FVO liabilities are not priced significantly different than trading liabilities, 
investors do not seem to be concerned about opportunistic behavior of bank managers in their FVO use. 
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questionable if the expected decrease in information asymmetry also holds for entities 
that recognize own credit risk fair value changes. This notion can be reinforced by 
experimental results suggesting that the effect is not correctly understood by investors 
(Lachmann et al., 2010; Gaynor et al., 2011). Moreover, even the standard setter itself is 
unstable in its opinion on the recognition of credit risk changes: While according to the 
current IAS 39, these have to be recognized in the income statement, IFRS 9 stipulates 
the recognition in the other comprehensive income unless it creates or increases an 
accounting mismatch. Taken together, these implications of the recognition of credit 
risk fair value changes might result in diverging opinions among investors: Some 
investors might consider the recognition as misleading and adjust the income for the 
effect, some might agree with it, while some might not even detect it. Consequentially, 
the informational advantage of informed traders increases. In this case, we predict that 
the recognition would be detrimental to the reduction in information asymmetry which 
was attained through the adoption of the FVO for liabilities in the first place. On the 
contrary, following the arguments in favor of incorporating credit risk changes (e.g., 
Barth and Landsman, 1995; Chasteen and Ransom, 2007; Barth et al., 2008), this 
incorporation should not induce any negative effects on information asymmetry. These 
deliberations lead to the following hypotheses (stated in the alternatives): 
H2a: Adopters that recognize fair values changes due to credit risk changes 
exhibit differences in information asymmetry relative to non-adopters. 
H2b: Adopters that recognize fair values changes due to credit risk changes 
exhibit differences in information asymmetry relative to other adopters. 
4. Research design and sample description 
4.1 OLS regression model and variable definitions 
In order to analyze whether adopters experience lower levels of information asymmetry 
relative to non-adopters, we construct the following OLS regression model: 
LogBAi,t= β0+ β1LogPi,t+ β2LogTOi,t+ β3LogRET_SDi,t+ β4LogFFi,t+ β5LogNUMESTi,t 
+ β6LogBA_CNTRYc,t+ β7FVOi,t+ Σtβ8,tYEARt + εi,t                       (1) 
The dependent variable LogBAi,t is the log of the mean daily bid-ask spread averaged 
over the fourth month following fiscal year end. The spread is calculated daily as the 
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difference between the ask and the bid price divided by the mid-point price. We rely on 
bid-ask spreads to proxy the overall level of information asymmetry in line with prior 
research (e.g., Muller and Riedl, 2002; Leuz, 2003; Muller et al., 2011) because of their 
strong theoretical literature background.15  
As shown above, prior literature suggests that market makers set the bid-ask spread 
based on three components. To isolate the information asymmetry component, we 
include a set of control variables capturing the inventory-holding and order-processing 
cost components in the bid-ask spread as follows: LogPi,t is the log of the closing stock 
price measured on the beginning of the fourth month following fiscal year end. LogP is 
included as a control variable for order-processing costs that experience a proportional 
decrease for higher priced stocks (Benston and Hagerman, 1974; Stoll, 1978). Thus, the 
coefficient of LogP is predicted to be negative. LogTOi,t is the log of the mean daily 
volume traded on per share basis averaged over the fourth month following fiscal year 
end. LogRET_SDi,t is the log of the standard deviation of the bank’s stock returns 
measured over the fourth month following fiscal year end. Market-makers’ inventory-
holding cost and risk are controlled for by including LogTO which proxies for liquidity 
and LogRET_SD which proxies for volatility, i.e. uncertainty of returns. In line with the 
extant literature, we predict the coefficient to be negative for LogTO (Demsetz, 1968; 
Barnea and Logue, 1975; Copeland and Galai, 1983) and to be positive for LogRET_SD 
(Welker, 1995; Leuz and Verecchia, 2000; Muller and Riedl, 2002). LogFFi,t is the log 
of the percentage of free float shares measured on the beginning of the fourth month 
following fiscal year end. Assuming that information asymmetry is higher for firms 
with smaller proportions of freely traded shares (Leuz and Verrecchia, 2000), LogFF 
captures these differences in the availability of tradeable shares and thus its coefficient 
is predicted to be negative. LogNUMESTi,t is the log of the number of different analyst 
estimations measured during the fourth month following fiscal year end. Since the 
banks’ information environment is controlled for by including LogNUMEST, it is 
expected that a better information environment, i.e. a higher number of analyst 
estimations, reduces information asymmetry (Brennan and Subrahmanyam, 1995; Leuz 
and Verrecchia, 2000). As large banks are subject to a better information environment, 
                                                
15 Alternative dependent variables (e.g., zero-trading days and share turnover) are not employed due to 
their weaker theoretical background on capturing information asymmetry. 
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it is necessary to ensure that the bid-ask spreads are not driven by this underlying bank 
characteristic. In this context, prior research (e.g., Bhushan, 1989; Rock et al., 2000) 
shows that firm size is a major determinant of analyst following and thus highly 
correlated with the latter.16 Hence, LogNUMEST also serves as our bank size variable. 
LogBA_CNTRYc,t is the log of the average percentage bid-ask spread for the country in 
which the bank is domiciled. Before averaging across all sample banks within a country 
and within a year, the daily percentage bid-ask spread is calculated by bank and year for 
the entire initial sample.17 LogBA_CNTRY controls for differences regarding market 
microstructures across the distinct stock exchanges of our sample. In line with findings 
of Muller et al. (2011), we predict a positive coefficient for LogBA_CNTRY. We also 
include year fixed effects in our regression models to control for differences across the 
sample years, in particular the decreasing time trend in bid-ask spreads (Chordia et al, 
2008). Consistent with the extant literature, we use the log-linear form for all 
continuous variables since multiplicative relations between the spread and its 
determinants are identified by most analytical models (e.g., Stoll, 1978, Glosten and 
Milgrom, 1985). FVOi,t is an indicator variable that equals one if the bank adopted the 
FVO for liabilities and zero otherwise. To the extent that adopters have a higher 
reporting quality, FVO is expected to exhibit a negative coefficient indicating a decline 
in bid-ask spreads and thus in information asymmetry.  
Following Rogers (1993), we run all OLS regression models by using 
heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors which are clustered by bank. One concern is 
that this specification might neglect unobserved heterogeneity, i.e. omitted bank 
characteristics that are correlated with information asymmetry. The opposing concern 
using bank fixed effects is that our variables of interest are time-invariant for the vast 
majority of the banks included in the sample. Almost 90 percent of the banks do not 
change from being a non-adopter to being an adopter or vice versa and so the fixed 
effects models are estimated for only around 10 percent of the total sample. 
Nevertheless, we additionally use fixed effects estimations with standard errors 
clustered on the firm level to eliminate all time-invariant differences between banks. 
                                                
16 Consistently, the spearman correlation between LogNUMEST and banks’ market value is around 70 
percent in our sample. Using alternatively the banks’ market value (four months after a bank’s fiscal year 
end) as our size variable (instead of LogNUMEST) leaves the results qualitatively unchanged (results 
reported in Appendix 2).  
17 The bank sample used in the calculation of LogBA_CNTRY consists of 671 observations. 
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The primary inferences drawn from the main analysis are not affected qualitatively by 
this alteration (see Appendix 3). However, given the opposing concern, these results 
need to be interpreted cautiously.18  
As already pointed out, the adoption of the FVO is subject to certain eligibility criteria. 
This implies that in order to avoid endogeneity bias in our study, it is crucial to 
differentiate between banks that intentionally refrain from adopting the FVO and those 
that actually are not eligible to adopt it. Since an entity is not obliged to provide 
disclosures on the reasons why it did not designate any financial liabilities at fair value 
through profit or loss, only very few non-adopters do so. However, according to IFRS 
7.25, an entity has to disclose book and fair values of all financial instruments. We 
make use of these disclosures in order to identify those banks that very probably lack 
eligibility: If disclosures reveal that for all financial liabilities fair values equal book 
values,19 then the adoption of the FVO would not help to eliminate or reduce an 
accounting mismatch, since neither the balance sheet nor the income statement would 
be undergoing any changes. Also in these cases the designation according to the second 
eligibility criterion, i.e. management and evaluation of the liabilities’ performance on a 
fair value basis, would not be in the intention of IAS 39. Following this rationale, we 
regard these banks as lacking eligibility.20 On the contrary, if banks’ disclosures reveal 
differences between fair and book values of financial liabilities these banks are viewed 
as generally being eligible for the adoption of the FVO. Assuming that investors are not 
provided with additional information on this matter through other sources, they might 
wonder whether there simply do not exist any accounting mismatches or liabilities that 
are evaluated on a fair value basis or whether the management is disregarding the 
opportunity to reduce accounting mismatches and disclose information about how the 
performance of certain liabilities is evaluated. This would lead to the conclusion that by 
refraining from the FVO adoption, the banks’ management not only misses an 
opportunity to reduce information asymmetry but it could even have the opposite effect, 
i.e. an information asymmetry increase due to decreasing investor confidence. 
                                                
18 Given the implausible negative sign of the estimated coefficient on LogBA_CNTRY the expressed 
concerns seem to be justified.    
19 In some cases, the fair values of liabilities are not disclosed as numerical values but the annual report 
contains statements like “the fair values of liabilities do not materially differ from their book values”. For 
the purpose of this study these cases are treated as if fair values would be exactly equal to book values.   
20 However, it has to be noted that this rationale does not apply to liabilities that are eligible because they 
are part of a contract that contains one or more substantive embedded derivatives. 
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In the next part of our analysis, we examine whether adopters with fair value changes 
due to credit risk changes (adopters with CRE) exhibit differences in information 
asymmetry relative to non-adopters as well as relative to adopters without such fair 
value changes (adopters without CRE). In order to do so, the dummy FVOi,t in equation 
(1) is replaced by CREi,t resulting in the following model: 
LogBAi,t= β0 + β1LogPi,t + β2LogTOi,t + β3LogRET_SDi,t + β4LogFFi,t  
+ β5LogNUMESTi,t + β6LogBA_CNTRYc,t + β7CREi,t + Σtβ8,tYEARt + εi,t     (2) 
CREi,t is an indicator variable that equals one if the bank adopted the FVO for liabilities 
and recognized fair value changes attributable to changes in the credit risk, zero 
otherwise. To test for H2a we exclude all adopters without CRE from the sample. If 
investors do not perceive these recognized fair value changes as transparency 
decreasing, we expect the estimated coefficient of CRE to be negative, and vice versa. 
To test for H2b we exclude all non-adopters. Here, the expectations and interpretations 
regarding CRE differ from H2a. If the recognition of fair value changes attributable to 
changes in the credit risk exhibits a negative incremental effect on the information 
asymmetry beyond the effects induced by the adoption of the FVO, CRE is expected to 
exhibit a positive coefficient, and vice versa. 
We do not further differentiate between types of FVO financial liabilities. It might be 
hypothesized that the different levels of information asymmetry are also influenced by 
the respective type due to diverging methods of determining the fair value. For example, 
a fair value derived from the market price of issued debt securities is assumed to be 
more reliable than the fair value of customer deposits derived from internal models 
(e.g., Hitz, 2007). However, the voluntary disclosures of the banks in our sample do not 
allow for a clean differentiation in this regard, as the banks do not sufficiently specify 
different types.21 
 
                                                
21 In a similar spirit, it can be hypothesized that the trigger for the change in credit risk has an influence on 
information asymmetry: Differences might exist between banks that experience changes in their credit 
risk as a direct result of a down- or upgrading by a rating agency and others that solely determine the 
change in credit risk as the residual amount of change in fair value that is not attributable to changes in 
the market risk. Again, the information disclosed by the banks in our sample regarding this matter is too 
scarce to analyze possible differences that arise from these factors. 
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4.2 Treatment effects model 
As already mentioned, the comparison of FVO adopters and non-adopters might suffer 
from endogeneity bias. Besides excluding all non-adopters whose financial liabilities’ 
book values equal fair values as elaborated in more detail above, another way of 
mitigating the endogeneity concern would be to implement a change analysis design 
where banks’ bid-ask spreads are compared before and after the adoption of the FVO. 
However, due to several reasons such a change analysis is not feasible in the context of 
our study. First of all, in the period under review (2006-2010) a large majority of banks 
in the sample turns out to be sticky regarding their use of the FVO. As already indicated 
above, only 4 up to 7 banks per year change from being a non-adopter to being an 
adopter, or vice versa, yielding an insufficient number of observation. Also, an 
extension of the period under review to years before 2006 is not considered as a viable 
option since the FVO in its current version, i.e. including the eligibility criteria, became 
effective for financial years beginning on or after 1 January 2006. Moreover, before 
2005, listed companies in the European Union were not required to prepare their 
consolidated financial statements according to IFRS. Instead, we follow Fiechter (2011) 
and additionally address endogeneity by the use of a two-stage treatment effects model 
(Heckman, 1979).22 In the first stage, the determinants of the decision to adopt the FVO 
for financial liabilities are incorporated in the following probit regression: 
PR(FVOi,t = 1) = β0 + β1REGQUALi,t + β2BIG4i,t + β3LEVi, t+ β4SIZEi,t + β5FVOAi,t  
 + εi,t   (3) 
The value of REGQUALi,t equals the regulatory quality index variable for 2008 as 
presented by the World Bank (Kaufmann et al., 2009) for the respective bank’s domicile 
country. Regulatory quality expresses the ability of a country’s government to permit 
and promote the development of the private sector by formulating and implementing 
sound policies and regulations. Fiechter (2011) shows that banks domiciled in countries 
with strong regulatory environment are more prone to adopt the FVO to reduce 
accounting mismatches. Assuming that this relationship is still valid when exclusively 
regarding the adoption of the FVO for liabilities, we expect FVO to be positively 
                                                
22 While Ball et al. (2012) follow the same two-stage treatment effects approach our model specification 
is quite different: Since our study is based in an IFRS setting we align our model with Fiechter (2011) and 
adjust it for the fact that we specifically analyze the adoption of the FVO for liabilities. 
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associated with REGQUAL. We construct BIG4i,t as binary variable that equals one if 
according to information provided in the bank’s annual report, the financial statements 
are audited by one of the Big 4 audit firms. Since Big 4 audit firms are supposed to 
provide more expertise than their competitors we follow Fiechter (2011) by expecting 
the relation between BIG4 and FVO to be of a positive nature. SIZEi,t is computed as the 
natural logarithm of the bank’s total assets. Chang et al. (2009) as well as Song (2008) 
find that large banks are more prone to adopt the FVO, which might result from an 
increase in complexity for larger banks as proposed by Fiechter (2011), therefore we 
expect the relation between SIZE and FVO to be of a positive nature. Calculated as the 
ratio of the bank’s debt to total assets, LEVi,t presents the general proportion of financial 
liabilities that is potentially eligible for the FVO. We assume that banks with a higher 
proportion of these liabilities are more prone to adopt the FVO for liabilities, i.e. a 
positive association between FVO and LEV is predicted. FVOAi,t is defined as a binary 
variable that takes the value of one if the bank adopted the FVO for financial assets, 
zero otherwise. Assuming that FVOA proxies for the suitability of the FVO concept in 
the specific banks’ business model environment as well as for the management’s 
general attitude towards the FVO, we predict that banks which adopt the FVO for assets 
are more likely to adopt it for liabilities as well.23 
For the comparison of adopters with CRE and non-adopters under H2a we estimate 
equation (3) exclusively for these two subgroups and replace FVOi,t by CREi,t, which 
results in the following model:  
PR(CREi,t = 1) = β0 + β1REGQUALi,t + β2BIG4i,t + β3LEVi,t + β4SIZEi,t + β5FVOAi,t  
+ εi,t              (4)  
None of the determining variables is altered since, in essence, it is still a comparison of 
FVO adopters and non-adopters. The recognition of fair value changes attributable to 
changes in the credit risk here is not subject to any further self-selection since there is 
no optional character inherent to the recognition. Once the FVO is adopted, all 
occurring fair value changes have to be recognized. For this reason, no treatment effects 
model is computed for the comparison of adopters with CRE and adopters without 
                                                
23 Fiechter (2011) shows that there is a positive association between the adoption of the fair value option 
for liabilities and for assets. 
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CRE. 
In the second stage, we derive the inverse Mills ratios (IMR) from the probit regression 
equations (3) and (4) and include them in equation (1) and (2), respectively. This 
proceeding yields the following self-selection corrected models: 
LogBAi,t= β0 + β1LogPi,t + β2LogTOi,t + β3LogRET_SDi,t + β4LogFFi,t  
+ β5LogNUMESTi,t + β6LogBA_CNTRYc,t + β7FVOi,t + IMRi,t + Σtβ8,tYEARt + εi,t        (5) 
LogBAi,t= β0 + β1LogPi,t + β2LogTOi,t + β3LogRET_SDi,t + β4LogFFi,t  
+ β5LogNUMESTi,t + β6LogBA_CNTRYc,t + β7CREi,t + IMRi,t + Σtβ8,tYEARt  + εi,t     (6) 
4.3 Sample description 
We run queries in the databases Thomson Reuters Knowledge, Compustat, and 
Datastream to identify European banks that prepared their financial statements for the 
financial year 2008 under IFRS. From the resulting list we exclude all banks that are 
subsidiaries of other banks present in the sample, for which no annual report could be 
found on the banks’ homepage in the English, German or French language, that do not 
prepare their 2008 IFRS financial statements on a consolidated basis and those that were 
not publicly traded on at least one European stock exchange or went out of existence by 
the end of the financial year 2008. This proceeding yields a sample of 178 banks before 
data collection, which is further reduced by banks with no stock price data available on 
Datastream or with too opaque disclosures regarding financial instruments. The 
resulting sample of 166 banks leads to a number of 830 potential firm-year observations 
for the time period under review, i.e. 2006-2010. Due to insufficient data for the 
variables calculation we arrive at a number of 453 available firm-year observations, 
which presents our sensitivity sample. To obtain the primary sample of 391 firm-year 
observations we eliminate all non-adopters whose financial liabilities’ book values 
equal fair values from the sensitivity sample.24 Table 1 illustrates the sample selection 
process in more detail.  
                                                
24 Due to a relatively small sample size, our analyses use an unbalanced panel data set to maximize 
statistical power. We examine a potential survivorship bias in our sample twofold: We rerun our entire set 
of regression models (1) with a balanced data set (N = 260) and alternatively (2) by including an indicator 
variable equal to 1 if a bank is present in the sample for the entire five years and 0 otherwise. The 
inferences drawn from the ones reported are not affected qualitatively. 
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[Insert Table 1 here] 
Different data sources are used for the empirical analysis. We hand-collect data from 
the annual reports 2006 until 2010 regarding the decision to designate financial 
instruments at fair value through profit or loss in order to generate the variables FVO 
and FVOA. For those annual reports where the adoption of the FVO for liabilities is 
confirmed, we additionally analyze if fair value changes arose from changes in credit 
quality (CRE). For all non-adopters we examine if the disclosed liabilities’ fair values 
are equal to their book values. Finally, we hand-collect the data regarding the audit firm 
(BIG4). Accounting data used for the calculation of the variables SIZE and LEV are 
obtained from Worldscope. The data for all variables computed by the use of capital 
markets data, i.e. LogBA, LogP, LogTO, LogRET_SD, LogFF, and LogBA_CNTRY, are 
obtained from Datastream. The variable LogNUMEST is calculated by using data from 
I/B/E/S. 
4.4 Descriptive statistics 
Table 2 presents the distribution by country and year for the primary sample.  
[Insert Table 2 here] 
The last four columns indicate that overall there are 262 adopters, 130 of which 
recognize fair value changes attributable to changes in the credit risk, and 129 non-
adopters. The relation of adopters to non-adopters is fairly stable across the five years. 
While in 2006 only 6 out of 43 adopters recognize fair value changes attributable to 
changes in the credit risk, this proportion increases considerably until 2010 (31 out of 
47). Italy, Norway, and England represent the countries with the highest number of 
observations as well as with the highest number of adopters. None of the adopters is 
domiciled in Finland, Liechtenstein, Russia, Slovenia, and Turkey, however these 
countries are also well below average in terms of total observation numbers.  
Panel A of Table 3 reports descriptive statistics about the relative amounts of the FVO 
and the credit risk effects. For all adopters the FVO liabilities amount to 7 percent (21 
percent) of total assets (debt) on average while for adopters with CRE the absolute 
value of the credit risk effect exceeds the absolute value of net income on average by 11 
percent. Panel B and panel C depict descriptive statistics for the variables used in the 
first and second stage regression on the primary sample. The mean (median) LogBA for 
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the FVO adopting banks is -5.863 (-5.973) whereas it is -5.080 (-5.020) for non-
adopters indicating a lower spread for adopters and thus lower information asymmetries 
among the investors. The descriptive statistics also reveal that, on average, the FVO 
adopting banks have statistically larger analyst following, higher average daily trading 
volumes and higher percentages of free float shares relative to non-adopters. 
[Insert Table 3 here] 
Table 4 shows Pearson and Spearman correlations among the variables used in the main 
analysis. 
[Insert Table 4 here] 
Both Pearson and Spearman correlations between LogBA and FVO show that in a 
univariate sense adopters exhibit statistically significantly lower bid ask spreads than 
non-adopters. Moreover, the correlations also indicate that the recognition of credit risk 
changes is not detrimental to this reduction in information asymmetry since CRE is also 
negatively correlated with LogBA. The statistical significant correlations between the 
independent variables are small to moderate so we do not expect any multicollinearity 
problems arising from our model specifications. 
5. Results 
5.1 Main analysis 
Panel A of Table 5 presents results for the univariate comparisons of bid-ask spreads 
across the different partitions of the primary sample. 
[Insert Table 5 here] 
The differences of means are tested using a two-tailed t-test and the differences in 
medians by using a Wilcoxon rank-sum test. When compared to non-adopters, the 
average bid-ask spread (difference = 0.004) as well as the median is lower for adopters 
at the one percent significance level. In a univariate sense, these results are consistent 
with our expectations as hypothesized under H1. When analyzing the bid-ask spreads of 
adopters with CRE versus non-adopters, the mean (difference = 0.005) and median of 
the former group are lower at the one percent significance level. This can be interpreted 
as first indicative evidence that lower levels of information asymmetry induced by the 
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adoption of the FVO are not reversed through the recognition of fair value changes 
attributable to credit risk changes (H2a). This notion is reinforced by examining bid-ask 
spreads of adopters with CRE compared to those of adopters without CRE. Here, 
marginally significant evidence (at the ten percent level) is provided for a decrease of 
average bid-ask spreads for adopters with CRE compared to Non-CRE adopters 
(difference = 0.002) (H2b). 
Panel B depicts the results of the ordinary least squares regression analysis of 
information asymmetry differences for the primary sample. Model 1 serves as the 
benchmark regression. The estimated coefficients of all control variables are in line with 
the predicted signs. For LogP (-0.155; t-statistic = -2.90), LogTO (-0.261; t-statistic =  
-6.77), and LogNUMEST (-0.810; t-statistic = -8.40), the coefficients are statistically 
significant at the one percent level, while they lack statistical significance for LogFF ( 
-0.114; t-statistic = -0.74), LogRET_SD (0.203; t-statistic = 1.54), and LogBA_CNTRY 
(0.316; t-statistic = 0.93). 
Model 2 includes FVO, the variable of interest. In line with H1, the coefficient of FVO 
(-0.400; t-statistic = -2.52) is negative and significant at the five percent level. The 
coefficients of the control variables do neither change in terms of signs nor in terms of 
significance, which is also true for the models 3 and 4. The results are consistent with 
lower levels of information asymmetry for adopters as reflected in smaller bid-ask 
spreads.  
Model 3 includes CRE, the variable of interest in order to compare adopters with CRE 
to non-adopters. The negative coefficient of CRE (-0.582; t-statistic = -3.21) at a 
significance level of one percent lends support to H2a by indicating that the recognition 
of fair value changes attributable to changes in the credit risk is not detrimental to the 
lower level of information asymmetry attained through the adoption of the FVO. The 
comparison of adopters with CRE and other adopters in model 4 reveals that 
information asymmetry is even lower for the former group as indicated by the negative 
sign of the estimated coefficient for CRE (-0.328; t-statistic = -2.04), thus providing 
supportive evidence in favor of H2b. Overall, this result does not back claims that the 
recognition of fair value changes attributable to changes in the credit risk is perceived as 
transparency decreasing by investors. 
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To illustrate the economic magnitude of the effect, we exponentiate the value of -0.400 
for the estimated coefficient on FVO in model 2. The resulting value of exp(-0.400) = 
0.670 represents the ratio of the geometric mean spreads for adopters to the geometric 
mean spreads for non-adopters. This implies that the geometric mean spreads are 32 
percent lower for the adopters than for non-adopters. Similarly for the coefficient 
estimated on CRE in model 3 exp(-0.582) = 0.559 implies that the geometric mean 
spreads for adopters with CRE are 44 percent lower than those of non-adopters. 
5.2 Treatment effects 
Panel A of Table 6 presents results for the first-stage probit regressions across two 
different partitions of the primary sample.  
[Insert Table 6 here] 
Column (1) presents the results on the determinants for the FVO adoption for liabilities 
when using adopters as treatment and non-adopters as control group. The signs of the 
explanatory variables REGQUAL (0.399; z-statistic = 2.39), BIG4 (0.288; z-statistic = 
0.48), LEV (0.639; z-statistic = 1.57), SIZE (0.272; z-statistic = 6.76), and FVOA (0.590; 
z-statistic = 2.97) are in line with our predictions and statistical significant at the one or 
five percent level, except for BIG4 and LEV that lack significance. The pseudo R-
squared of the model equals 22.66 percent. Column (2) shows the results on the 
determinants when using only the adopters with CRE instead of all adopters as 
treatment group. Here, the signs of the significant coefficients still match the 
predictions. However, there are some changes in terms of statistical significance. The 
coefficient on REGQUAL (0.155; z-statistic = 0.76) loses its statistical significance, 
whereas the coefficient of LEV (1.677; z-statistic = 2.71) is now significant at the one 
percent level. Also, the pseudo R-squared increases to 37.77 percent. 
Panel B shows the results of the ordinary least squares regression that is now adjusted 
for potential self-selection bias by including the inverse Mills ratios computed from the 
probit models. In model 2, the statistical significance for IMR (0.986; t-statistic = 3.96) 
indicates that our two-stage approach successfully captures self-selection. However, the 
results and therefore the inferences from the main analysis do not change qualitatively. 
The control variables remain unchanged in terms of significance, with the exception of 
LogRET_SD now being significant at the five percent level. Most importantly, the 
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estimated coefficient on FVO (-1.750; t-statistic = -4.30) is now negative at the one 
percent level reinforcing the notion that information asymmetries are mitigated by the 
FVO for liabilities. The IMR (1.046; t-statistic = 4.87) in model 3 is statistically 
significant at the one percent level providing evidence for the presence of self-selection. 
However, when comparing to the results of the main analysis, the coefficient on the 
treatment variable CRE (-1.794; t-statistic = -5.02) increases both in magnitude and 
statistical significance. Overall, the treatment effect models reinforce the results of the 
main analysis. 
5.3 Additional analysis 
5.3.1 Sample alterations analysis 
In order to test the robustness of the primary sample results, we rerun our analysis with 
the sensitivity sample, i.e. with all observations available. The results of the multivariate 
comparisons of bid-ask spreads across different partitions are shown in Table 7. 
[Insert Table 7 here] 
The results of the base model are qualitatively consistent with the primary sample 
results. The coefficient on the treatment variable FVO (-0.418; t-statistic = -3.00) in 
model 2 increases both in magnitude and significance compared to the primary sample. 
The same is true for the treatment variable CRE (-0.605; t-statistic = -3.61) in model 3. 
Considering that the endogeneity bias that potentially arises from those banks where the 
liabilities’ book values equal fair values works against our hypotheses H1 and H2a, 
these outcomes further strengthens the overall robustness of our analysis. 
Panel A of Table 8 depicts the first stage regression results for the sensitivity sample. 
[Insert Table 8 here] 
In line with the main analysis, in column (1) adopters are used as treatment and non-
adopters as control group. With all signs remaining unchanged the coefficient on LEV  
(0.861; z-statistic = 2.31) is now significant at the five percent level. More importantly, 
the pseudo R-squared increases to 28.63 percent, compared to 22.66 percent for the 
primary sample (Panel A of Table 6). This lends support to our proceeding of excluding 
the observations where the liabilities’ book values equal fair values. The same holds 
when using adopters with CRE as treatment and non-adopters as control group. Here, 
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the pseudo R-squared increases to 42.97 percent.  
The results of the second stage are tabulated in Panel B. Our assumption that the self-
selection is more pronounced when including the previously excluded non-adopters is 
supported since IMR (0.948; t-statistic = 5.22) increases in terms of significance, 
compared to the primary sample (0.986; t-statistic = 3.96). However, after having 
adjusted for this self-selection by including IMR, the statistical significance of the 
coefficient on the variable of interest FVO (-1.641; t-statistic = -5.91) in model 2 even 
increases. The same is true for CRE (-1.721; t-statistic = -6.40) in model 3, where IMR 
(1.014; t-statistic = 6.10) increases in terms of statistical significance. Again, these 
results of the sensitivity sample provide further support for the robustness of our 
inferences drawn from the main analysis. 
A further concern in our study is that adopters with overall poor disclosures may simply 
not report fair value changes that arise from credit risk changes. To mitigate this 
concern we follow prior literature (Lang and Lundholm, 1993; Healy and Palepu, 2001) 
which argues that more (informative) disclosure lowers the cost of information 
acquisition for analysts, thereby increasing analysts following. Thus, we first rank 
LogNUMEST into deciles and then reestimate our regression models without the banks 
in the lowest decile, i.e. we exclude the banks with the lowest analyst following and 
hence poorest disclosure. We find that our results (untabulated) do not materially 
change, compared to the ones reported in the main analysis. To sum up, these findings 
indicate that our results are not affected by adopters with overall poor disclosures. 
5.3.2 Different effects due to negative vs. positive fair value changes 
We also analyze whether the results concerning H2a and H2b are sensitive to a further 
partitioning of CRE into negative and positive fair value changes, i.e. gains and losses 
that arise from changes in credit risk. For this purpose, we run models 3 and 4 of the 
main analysis separately with adopters that recognize gains and with adopters that 
recognize losses due to credit risk fair value changes. Untabulated results show that 
there are no qualitative differences, compared to the main analysis, except for one minor 
variation. In model 4 the estimated negative coefficient on CRE (-0.294; t-statistic =  
-1.58) loses its statistical significance when regarding adopters that recognized losses in 
comparison to the control group of adopters without CRE. Overall, the results suggest 
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that the direction of the fair value changes attributable to changes in credit risk has no 
material impact on information asymmetry. 
5.3.3 Effect of financial crisis 
Finally, we exclude the years 2008 and 2009 from our main analysis in order to isolate 
potential influences of the financial crisis, especially on the market data. Untabulated 
results suggest that the evidence from the main analysis is reinforced by omitting the 
crisis years. In model 2, the estimated coefficient on FVO (-0.5701; t-statistic = -3.35) is 
now significant at the one percent level, while CRE (-0.5545; t-statistic = -3.96) in 
model 3 remains significant at said level. In model 4, the estimated coefficient on CRE 
(-0.3961; t-statistic = -2.46) also remains significant at the five percent level. Again, this 
reinforces the notion that investors do not perceive the recognition of credit risk evoked 
fair value changes as detrimental to the quality and transparency of financial statements. 
6. Conclusion 
This paper contributes to the extant literature on the recognition of liabilities’ fair value 
changes, especially those attributable to changes in the credit risk, by measuring the 
impact on information asymmetry in an IFRS setting. Using data from European banks 
for the years 2006 until 2010, we provide empirical evidence on whether adopting the 
FVO for liabilities under IAS 39 leads to lower levels of information asymmetry as 
reflected in smaller bid-ask spreads. We argue that the adoption of the FVO in 
accordance with the eligibility criteria increases reporting quality and therefore has a 
positive impact on the information levels of uninformed traders and the market maker. 
Consequentially, this leads to a decrease of information asymmetry among investors. 
Our findings consistently show that adopters exhibit smaller bid-ask spreads than non-
adopters. We next investigate whether the recognition of fair value changes that are 
attributable to changes in the own credit risk and the resulting counterintuitive income 
statement effects are detrimental to the reduction in information asymmetry attained 
through the FVO. For this purpose, we alter the treatment group of adopters by 
excluding all adopters without such changes, while holding constant the control group 
of non-adopters. The results show that the bid-ask spreads for the former group are still 
significantly smaller relative to the non-adopters. This indicates that the recognition of 
credit risk evoked fair value changes is not perceived as transparency decreasing by 
investors. Moreover, we also find statistical significant evidence for a decrease of bid-
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ask spreads when comparing adopters with credit risk fair value changes to adopters 
without such changes. These results again do not support claims that recognizing fair 
value changes attributable to changes in the credit risk is detrimental to the transparency 
of financial statements. The inferences drawn from our main analysis do not change 
when performing different sample alterations and controlling for endogeneity. The latter 
is done twofold: We exclude banks classified as lacking eligibility for the FVO adoption 
and additionally use treatment effects models. 
Bearing in mind that the study is subject to several limitations, the results should be 
interpreted cautiously. One of the limitations inherent to the research design is omitted 
variable bias. Although we address this bias by controlling for unobserved 
heterogeneity through our fixed effects models, we cannot rule out that other 
confounding variables may affect our results. For instance, they might not be 
exclusively driven by the difference regarding the FVO adoption or the fair value 
changes due to credit risk changes, but by additional differences between the two 
groups that also the inverse Mills ratio fails to capture. Also, our analyses in regards to 
endogeneity and self-selection bias neglect financial liabilities that are eligible for the 
FVO adoption under IAS 39 because they belong to a contract that contains one or more 
substantive embedded derivatives. Finally, the results presented in this study might 
suffer from a lack of generalization to financial institutions in a broader context since 
our sample is limited exclusively to banks that are predominantly domiciled in highly 
developed countries. 
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Table 1: Sample selection 
 
54 
Table 2: Primary sample distribution: Adopters vs. Non-Adopters by country and year 
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Table 3: Descriptive statistics on primary sample 
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Table 3: Descriptive statistics on primary sample (continued)  
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Table 5: Fair value option for liabilities and the effects on information asymmetry 
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Table 6: Treatment regression of LogBA on the application of FVO (CRE) 
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Table 7: Fair value option for liabilities and the effects on information asymmetry 
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Table 8: Treatment regression of LogBA on the application of FVO (CRE) for liabilities 
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Appendix 1: Definition of variables   
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Appendix 2: Fair value option for liabilities and the effects on information asymmetry 
using market value (MVE) as bank size variable 
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Appendix 3: Fair value option for liabilities and the effects on information asymmetry 
using fixed effects models 
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Capital Market Reactions to the Reclassification of Financial Assets under IAS 39 
– Evidence from European Banks 
 
This paper investigates the investors’ reaction to the reclassification of financial 
instruments carried out by European banks during the financial crisis under the 
amendment to IAS 39. The reaction is analyzed by comparing the value relevance of 
book vs. disclosed fair values for reclassified financial instruments. The findings 
suggest that book values possess higher relative informativeness for reclassified 
financial instruments, indicating that investors do not view the reclassification as mere 
earnings management but as an adequate means to depart from distorted fair values. 
Furthermore, reclassifications from the held-for-trading category into held-to-maturity 
are identified as the main driver for the higher explanatory power of book values. Also, 
the results show that disclosed fair values are incrementally value relevant beyond book 
values only for reclassifications from held-for-trading into held-to-maturity. Finally, 
some evidence indicates that the type of reclassification influences the pricing of the 
book values. The paper complements recent studies on value relevance of fair values 
during the financial crisis as well as on the banks’ reclassification behavior under the 
IAS 39 amendment. It contributes to extant knowledge by providing evidence that the 
investors’ reaction differs according to the different types of reclassification.  
 
Keywords: Value relevance, fair value, reclassification, financial instruments, IAS 39 
JEL Classification: G14, G21, M41
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1. Introduction 
The fair value measurement concept has been the subject of an ongoing debate among 
academics, standard setters and practitioners for several decades now. Rarely, if ever, 
were the opponents as numerous as during the financial crisis when the criticism 
centered on the following line of argument: Uncertainty regarding the value of the 
complex Subprime securities marked the beginning of the crisis, which soon started to 
spread to other financial instruments and thereby lead to a severe decrease of market 
liquidity. Consequentially, fair values were either derived from market prices that 
originated from panic and distressed sales or determined on the basis of biased market 
parameters. This resulted in excessive write-downs, which in turn increased the 
uncertainty about the fundamental value of the financial instruments and eroded banks’ 
regulatory capital. Accordingly, banks sold their financial instruments to increase cash 
resources or to prevent a further decrease in regulatory capital, which again depressed 
market prices and led to new write-downs (e.g., Bank of England, 2008; Gorton, 2008).1  
The IASB and the European Union reacted to the criticism by issuing and endorsing the 
amendment to IAS 39 Reclassification of financial assets on 15 October 2008 (IASB, 
2008). Through this amendment banks were enabled to depart from fair value 
measurement by changing the classification of financial instruments. Additionally, 
banks were given substantial earnings management opportunities since the amendment 
allowed these reclassifications to be carried out on a predefined retroactive basis. 
Several studies show the ample use of reclassifications by European banks in their 2008 
financial statements, with resulting effects on balance sheets and income statements 
being of considerable magnitude (e.g., CESR, 2009; Bischof et al., 2010). Also the 
determinants of the reclassification behavior were explored by some recent publications 
(e.g., Kholmy and Ernstberger, 2010). 
This paper analyzes how investors reacted to these reclassifications by examining the 
value relevance of book values and disclosed fair values of reclassified financial 
instruments for a sample of European banks for the period Q3 2008 until Q1 2010. The 
first part of the analysis provides evidence for the higher relative value relevance of 
book values, leading to the conclusion that investors do not view the reclassifications as 
                                                
1 However, by analyzing the effects retrospectively Laux and Leuz (2010) do not find evidence for the 
claim that fair value accounting lead to severe contagion that worsened the financial crisis. 
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a mere earnings management tool but as an adequate measure to depart from distorted 
fair values. Next, I investigate whether this result is particularly driven by any of the 
different types of reclassification. According to the evidence, the higher informativeness 
of book values is especially distinct for reclassifications made out of the held-for-
trading (HFT) category into held-to-maturity (HTM). A possible explanation for this 
finding is that here the IAS 39.9 tainting rules of the HTM category provide for a 
comparatively high credibility of the reclassification. The results of the incremental 
value relevance study show that investors seem to make use of the fair value disclosures 
only for the reclassification from HFT into HTM. In the next part, I analyze whether 
investors’ pricing of book values differs between the types of reclassification. The 
findings suggest that assets reclassified from HFT into HTM and from available-for-sale 
(AFS) into loans and receivables (LAR) are priced higher than the ones reclassified 
from HFT into LAR. This outcome reveals that investors perceive the latter type of 
reclassification as least credible. Finally, when comparing the peak crisis period with 
the recovery period, the results indicate that the higher informativenss of book values is 
especially pronounced during the recovery period. 
To the best of my knowledge, this paper is the first to analyze the value relevance of 
financial instruments reclassified under the amendment to IAS 39. It expands the extant 
literature on value relevance of fair value information for debt securities (e.g., Barth et 
al., 1996; Park et al., 1999; Khurana and Kim, 2003) and complements the more recent 
studies on value relevance of fair values during the financial crisis (e.g., Kolev, 2009; 
Song et al., 2010), on the reclassification behavior of European banks under the 
amendment (e.g., Bischof et al., 2010; Fiechter and Novotny-Farkas, 2011) as well as 
on the value relevance of reclassifying vs. non-reclassifying banks (Paananen et al., 
2012). Notably, the paper contributes to extant knowledge by providing evidence that 
the investors’ reaction differs according to the different types of reclassification. 
Moreover, this paper provides valuable implications for practitioners, such as financial 
statement preparers and standard setters, since the investors’ reaction to the 
reclassifications forms an important part in the retrospective analysis of the actions 
taken to deal with the exceptional situation during the financial crisis.  
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 presents the IAS 39 
classification taxonomy for financial instruments. Section 3 provides a literature 
overview and develops the hypotheses. Section 4 elaborates on the research design and 
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section 5 describes the sample. The results of the empirical analysis regarding the 
relative and incremental value relevance of fair vs. book values are presented in section 
6. Finally, section 7 concludes. 
2. Institutional Background 
2.1 (Re)Classification of financial instruments according to IAS 39 old version 
In order to gain an understanding of the effects induced by the IAS 39 amendment, it is 
necessary to be familiar with the IAS 39.9 financial assets classification: Financial 
assets that are either HFT or that are designated as at fair value through profit or loss 
(FVO) are measured at fair value with value changes being recorded in the income 
statement. Financial instruments with a fixed maturity, fixed or determinable payments 
for which the entity has the intention and ability to hold to maturity and that do not meet 
the definition of LAR, have to be categorized as HTM. LAR are financial assets with 
fixed or determinable payments, which are neither quoted in an active market nor 
categorized as HFT or FVO. LAR and HTM financial assets are measured at amortized 
cost under the effective interest method. All financial instruments that do not belong to 
any of the mentioned categories are to be classified as AFS. These are measured on a 
fair value basis with resulting gains or losses being recognized directly in the equity 
reserve via the other comprehensive income (IAS 39.46 in conjunction with IAS 
39.55(b)).  
2.2 The amendments to IAS 39 and IFRS 7 Reclassification of financial assets 
Before the IAS 39 amendment Reclassification of financial assets, reclassifications 
were limited to the following two cases: (1) AFS financial instruments may be 
reclassified into the category HTM if the bank has the intent and ability to hold them 
until maturity, (2) if a classification as HTM becomes inappropriate due to changes in 
the intention or ability, the asset shall be reclassified as AFS. Reclassified financial 
instruments have to be accounted for at fair value, which implies that write-downs 
cannot be avoided through reclassifications. While these two types of reclassifications 
apply to IFRS as well as to US GAAP, there existed a difference concerning the 
category HFT before the amendment. According to IAS 39.50 old version, a 
reclassification into or out of this category is prohibited, whereas under US GAAP 
SFAS 115.15 such reclassifications are allowed in “rare circumstances“.  
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As the financial crisis worsened, the fair value measurement concept was accused of 
having a pro-cyclical effect and therefore aggravating the situation (e.g., Gorton, 2008). 
Moreover, critics argued that fair value information is not useful and even misleading to 
investors if it is derived from illiquid or biased markets (e.g., Gandy et al., 2008). 
European banks criticized the scarce possibilities to surrender from fair value 
measurement in favor of historical cost accounting and claimed to be disadvantaged in 
comparison to their US peers (e.g., CEBS, 2008). As a reaction to this criticism, on 13 
October 2008 the IASB issued the amendments to IAS 39 and IFRS 7 in absence of the 
otherwise mandatory due process, which permit to reclassify certain financial 
instruments out of the category HFT into HTM, LAR or AFS as well as out of the 
category AFS into LAR. On 15 October 2008 the amendments were endorsed into EU 
law (EC, 2008) with the following implications:  
1. A non-derivative financial instrument that meets the definition of LAR can be 
reclassified into this category if the entity has the ability and intent to hold this 
financial asset for the foreseeable future.  
2. In rare circumstances a non-derivative financial instrument can be reclassified out of 
HFT into HTM if the entity has the ability and intent to hold this asset until its 
maturity.  
3. The reclassification of non-derivative financial instruments out of the HFT into the 
AFS category is also limited to rare circumstances, which arise from an unusual 
single event that is highly unlikely to recur in the near term (IAS 39.BC104D).  
For all reclassified assets the fair value at the date of the reclassification becomes the 
new amortized cost. Any gain or loss that was recognized while the assets were still 
classified as HFT is not reversed upon reclassification. However, considerable earnings 
management opportunities arose from the fact that entities were given the possibility to 
opt for any date in the time period from 1 July to 31 October 2008 as the date of 
reclassification.2 For reclassifications made after 31 October 2008 the reclassification 
date has to correspond with the actual date the reclassification decision was made. In 
addition to the effects on book values and on the (other comprehensive) income, the 
reclassifications also influenced banks’ regulatory capital. While there are differences 
across European countries concerning the interdependency of unrealized fair value 
                                                
2 This opinion is shared by the IASB (see IAS 39.BC104B). 
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gains or losses and corresponding regulatory capital changes, the commonalities that are 
shared among almost all European jurisdiction are the full reflection of HFT fair value 
changes as well as the full reflection of unrealized AFS fair value losses in the 
regulatory capital.3  
According to the amendment to IFRS 7, the entity has to disclose the amounts and 
effects of the reclassifications as well as describe the rare circumstances that lead to the 
reclassifications. For each reporting period after the reclassification the entity has to 
present the reclassified assets’ book and fair values as well as fair value gains or losses 
that would have been resulted without the reclassification (IFRS 7.12A) 
3. Related literature and hypotheses development 
3.1 Related literature 
The literature review focuses on prior studies that deal with value relevance of fair 
value versus historical cost measurement in general and with value relevance of fair 
values in the context of the financial crisis. Additionally, the main results of recent 
studies on banks’ reclassification behavior will be summarized. 
3.1.1 Value relevance of fair value disclosures 
In one of the pioneering studies, Barth (1994) investigates the incremental value 
relevance of US GAAP fair value disclosures for banks’ investment securities.4 The 
results show that disclosed fair values of investment securities possess explanatory 
power incremental to historical cost information. Nelson (1996) looks at the 
incremental value relevance of disclosed fair values of different categories of US bank 
holdings’ financial instruments. The results suggest that while fair value disclosures of 
investment securities hold an incremental value relevance compared to historical cost 
book values, the disclosed fair values of loans do not. These findings are in line with the 
study of US bank holding companies by Eccher et al. (1996). It yields only mixed and 
weak evidence for the incremental value relevance of fair value disclosures for financial 
assets other than investment securities. Taken together, the results of the cited studies 
                                                
3 The main difference concerns unrealized fair value gains of the latter type, which are subject to a 
varying haircut before being recognized in the regulatory capital. See Bischof et al. (2010) who provide 
detailed information on country-specific levels of this haircut. 
4 Investment securities here represent mainly debt securities for which banks have the ability and intent to 
hold to maturity, which makes them most comparable to HTM financial instruments under IAS 39. The 
US GAAP rules that were in place during that period required them to be recognized at cost.  
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suggest that while investment securities’ fair value disclosures are incrementally value 
relevant compared to book values, this is not the case for other debt financial 
instruments. In contrast, however, Barth et al. (1996) find evidence that loans’ fair value 
disclosures do have incremental explanatory power in comparison to book values. For a 
sample of US bank holdings Park et al. (1999) show that unrealized gains and losses of 
AFS securities and HTM debt securities are incrementally value relevant. However, 
they also find that the explanatory power of value differences of AFS securities is 
higher compared to HTM securities. 
Unlike the previously cited incremental value relevance studies that seek to answer 
whether fair value disclosures are useful to investors in the sense that they possess 
additional value relevance beyond that of historical costs, Khurana and Kim (2003) use 
a relative value relevance approach. The question of relative information content is 
whether one measure alone is more informative to investors than the other. Using a 
sample of US bank holdings Khurana and Kim (2003) do not find evidence for higher 
value relevance of fair values relative to historical cost for financial instruments on an 
aggregated level. However, when further partitioning their sample, they find that loans’ 
historical cost information is more informative than fair values for small banks and for 
banks with no analysts following. The authors trace the inferiority of fair value 
information for loans back to the fact that loans are less actively traded and their fair 
values depend to a higher extent on subjectivity both in terms of the methods used and 
assumptions made. In line with this rationale, they also find that fair values of AFS 
financial instruments, which are more likely to be traded in active markets, are more 
relevant than their historical cost.  
3.1.2 Value relevance of fair values and the financial crisis 
Goh et al. (2009), Kolev (2009) and Song et al. (2010) explore the value relevance of 
fair values by analyzing US banks’ quarterly accounting information that was published 
during the financial crisis. Here, the main focus lies on differences in value relevance 
that stem from different methods in determining fair values, i.e. the three SFAS 157 fair 
value levels: Level 1 fair values are determined by using observable prices in active 
markets, whereas for level 2 fair values observable market prices for comparable 
instruments or observable market parameters are used as valuation model inputs. 
Finally, level 3 inputs are not observable and therefore subject to managers’ discretion. 
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The authors hypothesize that as a consequence of the higher exposure to managerial 
discretion coupled with decreasing investors’ confidence due to the financial crisis, 
level 3 fair values are less value relevant than level 2 and 1 fair values. All three studies 
find evidence that supports this hypothesis. Also, Goh et al. (2009) find that value 
relevance is lower at the climax of the financial crisis. 
The hitherto cited literature is exclusively limited to US banks. More recently, authors 
began to fill this research gap regarding value relevance of fair values in an 
international context. Using a sample of international IFRS reporting banks for the years 
2006-2008, Fiechter and Novotny-Farkas (2011) examine the effect of the financial 
crisis on the value relevance of fair values. Among other results, they find that in 
general, fair values are value relevant but the extent of the value relevance is influenced 
by the subprime exposure (investors value HFT and FVO assets less for banks with 
subprime exposure) and the stage of the financial crisis (investors value fair value assets 
to a lesser extent in 2008 compared to the two previous years). Beltratti et al. (2010) 
find that write-downs of US and European banks during the crisis are value relevant 
both for fair value and historical cost financial assets.  
3.1.3 Reclassification of financial instruments 
The reclassification behavior under the IAS 39 amendment is the subject of some recent 
studies. Using a sample of European banks, Kholmy and Ernstberger (2010) find that 
the propensity to reclassify financial instruments in the 2008 annual report increases 
with a bank’s size while it is negatively correlated with the profitability and capital 
market performance. Moreover, some evidence is presented showing that reclassifying 
banks are facing higher bid-ask-spreads after disclosing their reclassification decision, 
which indicates that the reclassification leads to an increase of information asymmetry. 
Fiechter (2011) also identifies the size and the profitability as determinants of the 
reclassification decision. Examining international banks, Bischof et al. (2010) as well as 
Paananen et al. (2012) find evidence that banks with poor capital adequacy ratios are 
more prone to make use of the reclassifications. Furthermore, using an event study on 
the date of the IASB’s regulatory change, Bischof et al. (2010) provide some evidence 
suggesting that capital market participants reacted positively to the newly created 
reclassification options. The authors support this notion by showing that in the year 
following the reclassification, buy and hold returns are significantly higher for 
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reclassifying banks than for non-reclassifying banks.5 However, Paananen et al. (2012) 
find that the value relevance of reclassifying banks' accounting numbers is lower after 
the reclassification when compared to non-reclassifying banks. The authors interpret 
this as evidence for investors disapproving of the reclassifications. 
In summary, the results of the four studies indicate that the reclassifications were used 
in order to manage earnings and capital resources. However, the perception of investors 
remain ambiguous since in this regard the results of Bischof et al. (2010) point in a 
different direction than those of Kholmy and Ernstberger (2010) and Paananen et al. 
(2012). 
The literature review shows that while several studies have been conducted on the value 
relevance of historical cost versus fair values of banks’ financial instruments before as 
well as during the financial crisis, the reclassification behavior was also analyzed. 
However, there is a lack of a study combining both aspects: The value relevance of 
book and fair values of reclassified assets. This void is to be filled with the present 
paper. Moreover, since the difference between book and fair values of reclassified 
assets is a result of explicit earnings management, the value relevance analysis sets 
itself apart from prior studies where debt securities’ fair values are just disclosed to 
provide additional information. Finally, providing evidence that the investors’ reaction 
also depends on the type of reclassification contributes to the extant literature and 
further deepens the understanding of effects induced by the reclassifications. 
3.2 Hypotheses development 
As presented in the literature review, evidence for the superiority of debt securities’ fair 
values over historical cost measures in terms of value relevance is rather mixed. Since 
the financial instruments that can be reclassified under the IAS 39 amendment consist 
exclusively of debt securities,6 the literature review leads to the expectation that book 
values possess a higher relative value relevance compared to fair values. 
                                                
5 In contrast to these rather short-term consequences, Bischof et al. (2010) also show that in the long-
term, reclassifying banks for which the reclassifications had a strong impact on net income experience an 
increase in information asymmetry. However, when banks provide full disclosure of the reclassification 
effects this increase vanishes. 
6 With the exception of the reclassification from HFT into AFS, which is ignored since here book values 
still equal fair values. 
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Furthermore, several studies find that value relevance of fair values declines with an 
increasing use of estimates for their determination (e.g., Nelson, 1996; Park et al., 1999; 
Khurana and Kim, 2003; Goh et al., 2009; Kolev, 2009). The rationale behind this 
finding is that estimates are subject to management discretion, which reduces reliability 
of the resulting accounting measures and thus value relevance (Barth et al., 2001). 
Whenever reliable and relevant prices from functioning markets do not exist, preparers 
have to determine fair values on the basis of estimates. During the financial crisis, 
exactly this absence of reliable and relevant prices from functioning markets was used 
as a main argument to abandon fair value measurement by reclassifying certain assets 
(e.g., EBF, 2008; Véron, 2008, Dobler and Kuhner, 2009). Accordingly, disclosed fair 
values of reclassified assets are likely to be derived from distorted market prices or 
entirely determined on the basis of estimates implying low value relevance.  
On the other hand, investors’ confidence in recognized accounting numbers might be 
negatively affected because banks used the reclassifications for earnings management 
(Bischof et al., 2010; Kholmy and Ernstberger, 2010; Fiechter, 2011). This 
opportunistic behavior potentially undermines the perceived reliability of the 
reclassified assets’ book values. Consequentially, book values are less value relevant to 
investors, which stick to the lower fair values (Paananen et al., 2012). However, this 
notion is not supported by the findings of Bischof et al. (2010) suggesting that capital 
market participants perceived the reclassifications as an adequate measure rather than as 
mere earnings management. Moreover, the reclassifications also enabled banks to avoid 
a further decrease of regulatory capital (Bischof et al., 2010; Paananen et al., 2012) 
which is supposed to have positive implications on investors’ valuation and therefore 
leading to book values of higher value relevance.  
Taken together, these deliberations lead to the following hypothesis stated in the 
alternative: 
H1a: Book values of the reclassified financial instruments possess a higher 
power in explaining equity values than disclosed fair values. 
Prior literature suggests that the value relevance of fair values differs between financial 
instrument categories (e.g., Eccher et al., 1996; Nelson, 1996). Assuming that this also 
holds for reclassified assets, I hypothesize that the relative value relevance differs 
between the new categories (LAR vs. HTM) and between the categories of origin (HFT 
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vs. AFS). In particular, differences might arise from the fact that different criteria have 
to be met to use the respective category. Namely, the reclassification into the HTM 
category requires the preparer to document the intention and ability to hold the financial 
instrument until its maturity. Additionally, for all reclassified financial instruments the 
rationale behind the reclassification has to be disclosed, e.g. why the respective market 
is seen as disordered. In conjunction with the obligation to hold the assets until their 
maturity, the information given about the malfunctioning capital markets is highly 
credible, since the obligation means to abandon the possibility of participating in a 
future increase of market prices by selling the positions. The financial statement 
preparer will abandon this possibility only when he expects the assets’ future 
contractual cash flows, which according to IFRS 7.12A also have to be disclosed, to be 
considerably higher than the level implied by current distorted market prices. The so-
called tainting rules according to IAS 39.9 ensure that the financial statement preparer 
adheres to the commitment.7 In summary, this represents a signaling mechanism, where 
managers convey private information through their accounting choice and thereby 
influence rational investors’ beliefs (Holthausen and Leftwich, 1983).8 Applied to the 
question of relative value relevance, this line of argument would lead to the hypothesis, 
that the higher explanatory power of book values is more pronounced for assets 
reclassified into the HTM category than for those reclassified into the LAR category. 
This is due to the fact that the latter lacks an equivalent to the described signaling 
mechanism: Here, the entity merely has to have the ability and intent to hold the 
financial asset for the foreseeable future. Firstly, foreseeable future is a more flexible 
criterion than the assets’ maturity and secondly, there is a lack of a sanction be it that 
the banks sells the assets shortly after the reclassification. Moreover, the possibility to 
reclassify out of HFT into HTM is limited to “rare circumstances“, whereas the 
reclassifications into LAR is not subject to this condition (IAS 39.50B in conjuncture 
with IAS 39.50D), which also renders the departure from allegedly distorted fair values 
less credible. In summary, I argue that the peculiarities of the reclassifications exhibit an 
influence on the credibility of the private information conveyed by management. More 
credible information reduces reliability concerns that arise from the earnings 
management implications (see above) and thus increases value relevance. 
                                                
7 These rules prohibit classifying any assets as HTM for two years if the entity had sold or transferred 
more than an insignificant amount of HTM instruments before their maturity. 
8 Beaver and Venkatachalam (2003) provide evidence that the determination of banks’ loan fair values is 
partly used as signaling in order to convey private information about future earning power. 
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Regarding the categories of origin (HFT vs. AFS), the financial instruments 
characteristics might cause differences in the relative value relevance. Accordingly, 
HFT assets are more prone to be traded in active markets than AFS assets, which 
decreases the exposure to less value-relevant, models-based fair values. However, it can 
also be argued that due to distorted and dried up markets, investors view both 
categories’ fair values as equally irrelevant. Consequently, they would not differ in 
terms of value relevance. In order to analyze whether the superiority of book values 
depends on the reclassification type, the following hypothesis is stated in the alternative: 
H1b: The superiority of reclassified assets’ book values in terms of relative 
value relevance depends on the type of reclassification. 
Although H1a states that reclassified assets’ fair values are inferior to book values in 
terms of relative informativeness, it is to be expected that the fair value disclosures are 
still of incremental value relevance to the book value information alone. Due to the 
earnings management implications (e.g., Kholmy and Ernstberger, 2010; Paananen et 
al., 2012), investors will make use of the disclosures required under the amendment to 
IFRS 7 by comparing book to fair values. Hence, I hypothesize that the difference 
between book and fair values exhibits an influence on the market value of equity in the 
following manner: The lower fair values are in comparison to book values, the lower is 
the market value of equity. Or, to put it differently: While investors rely more on 
reclassified assets’ book values than on fair values for their pricing decision (H1a), they 
still analyze to what extent disclosed fair values fall below book values and adjust their 
pricing accordingly. Consequentially, this information is incrementally value relevant. 
In contrast, however, investors might regard the fair values as a mere product of 
malfunctioning markets and therefore ignore them completely. In a similar vein, 
Fiechter and Novotny-Farkas (2011) show that the value relevance of fair value assets 
significantly decreased during the financial crisis. In this case one would not find any 
incremental value relevance. While the above discussion yields two competing 
hypotheses, I state the following one in the alternative: 
H2: The difference between book and fair values of reclassified financial 
instruments is negatively related to equity values. 
Among others, Easley and O’Hara (2004) show in their theoretical model that investors 
price assets associated with greater private information at a discount. As elaborated 
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above, the amount and credibility of private information conveyed by the 
reclassifications differs between the categories. Thus, investors’ pricing of reclassified 
assets’ book values is likely to reflect these assumed differences: Book values that lack 
credibility are less relevant to investors and consequentially valued less.  
On the empirical side, Fiechter and Novotny-Farkas (2011) provide evidence for pricing 
differences regarding the IAS 39 fair value categories. Accordingly, fair value option 
assets are priced less than held-for-trading assets. The authors argue that managers use 
the former category more opportunistically which increases information asymmetries 
between investors and managers. In a similar vein, the results of Goh et al. (2009), 
Kolev (2009), and Song et al. (2010) indicate that investors value level 3 assets less than 
level 1 and level 2 assets. 
The above deliberations lead to the following hypothesis (stated in the alternative): 
H3: Investors’ pricing of book values of reclassified financial instruments differs 
between the types of reclassification. 
Goh et al. (2009) as well as Fiechter and Novotny-Farkas (2011) find that the value 
relevance of recognized fair values decreases during the financial crisis as they are 
priced less by investors. This is mainly attributed to decreasing investor confidence. 
Conversely, in times of recovery, which result from increasing confidence, the value 
relevance will increase. Applying this relationship to the value relevance of reclassified 
assets leads to the expectation that the higher informativeness of book values is more 
articulate during the peak of the financial crisis than in times of recovery. This notion 
can be reinforced by comparing how reclassifications affect regulatory capital during 
crisis and during times of recovery. During crisis, abandoning low fair values exhibits a 
positive effect on regulatory capital. As already pointed out under the development of 
H1a, this is expected to favor book values in terms of higher value relevance. In times 
of recovery however, book and fair values are converging due to increasing fair values, 
which implies that the described effect on the regulatory capital is at least partly 
reversed. These considerations lead to the hypothesis H4 (stated in the alternative): 
H4: The superiority of reclassified assets’ book values in terms of relative value 
relevance differs during and after the peak of the crisis. 
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Moreover, I use the findings of Beaver and Venkatachalam (2003) to motivate H4. They 
partition disclosed loans’ fair values into discretionary, non-discretionary as well as 
noise components and show that value relevance differs across these components. 
Regarding the reclassified assets’ fair values, it is reasonable to assume that the 
proportion of the three components differ during and after the peak of the crisis. Thus, 
investors’ valuation regarding fair values of reclassified assets also differs. 
4. Research design 
Ohlson (1995) as well as Feltham and Ohlson (1996) state that the market value of 
equity (MVE) equals the book value of equity (BVE) plus discounted future abnormal 
earnings. In line with prior empirical studies (e.g., Nelson, 1996), I proxy expected 
abnormal earnings by reported net income (NI). In order to test the hypotheses on the 
relative informativeness, BVE is separated into the book value of all reclassified 
financial instruments SumBV and BVEnet, which equals BVE less SumBV. For the 
alternative model specification the fair value of all reclassified financial instruments 
SumFV is used instead of SumBV.9 In line with prior research (e.g., Park et al., 1999), I 
test for the incremental value relevance by using the difference between the book and 
the fair values of the reclassified financial instruments DiffSum as explanatory variable 
in addition to BVE. Next, the respective sum of book (BV) and fair values (FV) and their 
difference (Diff) are partitioned for all reclassified financial instruments into the specific 
types of reclassifications: From AFS into LAR (AFSLAR), from HFT into LAR 
(HFTLAR) and from HFT into HTM (HFTHTM). The reclassifications out of the HFT 
into the AFS category are disregarded. Here, book values still equal fair values 
rendering this type of reclassification futile for the purpose of the study.  
Fiechter and Novotny-Farkas (2011) show that investors value fair value assets less for 
banks with subprime investments. Accordingly, it might be hypothesized that 
characteristics of reclassified assets beyond those captured by the IAS 39 categories 
exhibit an influence on value relevance. However, since the amendment to IFRS 7 does 
not require disclosures about the reclassified asset types, this piece of information is 
rather scarce. It is therefore to be assumed that its influence on investors’ valuation is 
marginal. Nevertheless, in order to control for a possible influence of voluntary 
                                                
9 See Khurana and Kim (2003) who proceed in a similar fashion when comparing the relative 
informativeness of fair values and historical cost measures for different types of financial instruments. 
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disclosures about the types of reclassified assets, the variable COMPLEX is included. 
COMPLEX is defined as a binary variable that takes the value of 1 if the respective 
report contains specifications that identify at least parts of the reclassified assets as 
complex assets and zero otherwise. Assets that were heavily affected by the financial 
crisis such as Mortgage Backed Securities or Credit Default Obligations and therefore 
were traded on illiquid markets with the already explained implications for the fair 
value determination are regarded as being complex assets. Whereas common debt 
securities such as bonds or other corporate debt represent non-complex assets.  
The binary variable STOXX, that takes the value of one if the bank is included in the 
Stoxx® Europe 600 Banks Index and zero otherwise, is added to control for differences 
in bank size and liquidity of the banks’ shares. Since Sahut et al. (2011) provide 
evidence for cross-country differences in value relevance that they attribute to 
regulatory characteristics, the control variable RQ is included to control for differences 
in terms of regulatory quality. RQ equals the Regulatory Quality index variable for the 
respective country as presented by the World Bank (Kaufmann et al., 2009). Regulatory 
Quality expresses the ability of a country’s government to permit and promote the 
development of the private sector by formulating and implementing sound policies and 
regulations. REGQUAL also serves as a country variable in order to control for other 
country effects. Finally, time variable dummies on a quarterly basis (Q408 – Q110) are 
included to control for differences across the reporting periods. In sum this leads to the 
following three model specifications: 
(1) MVEt,i  =β0 + β1BVEnett,i + β2BVAFSLARt,i  + β3BVHFTLARt,i + β4BVHFTHTMt,i 
  +β5NIt,i + β6COMPLEXt,i  + β7STOXXt,i + β8RQt,i +  + εt,i 
(2) MVEt,i  =β0 + β1BVEnett,i + β2FVAFSLARt,i + β3FVHFTLARt,i + β4FVHFTHTMt,i 
  +β5NIt,i + β6COMPLEXt,i + β7STOXXt,i + β8RQt,i +  + εt,i  
(3) MVEt,i  =β0 + β1BVEt,i + β2DiffAFSLARt,i + β3DiffHFTLARt,i + β4DiffHFTHTMt,i 
  + β5NIt,i + β6COMPLEXt,i + β7STOXXt,i + β8RQt,i+ + εt,i 
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,where all variables are previously defined. 
All continuous variables are deflated by the number of shares outstanding at the end of 
the respective quarter. This proceeding is in line with prior research (e.g., Barth, 1994; 
Kolev, 2009) and as it is shown in Barth and Clinch (2009) a deflation based on the 
number of shares is effective in reducing scale effects in the modified Ohlson (1995) 
model. Observations for Q3 2008 until Q1 2010 are pooled resulting in an unbalanced 
sample. When conducting a value relevance-study in a time period that is as eventful as 
the one under review it is worthwhile to determine preferably exactly the date when the 
dependent variable is most likely to incorporate the information inherent to the 
independent variables. Accordingly, MVE is measured at the end of the first trading day 
after the publication of the financial report.10 
The definitions of all variables are summarized in Table 1. 
[Insert Table 1 here] 
The relative informativeness (H1a, H1b and H4) is tested by comparing each model’s 
R-squared with the Vuong (1989) test. As Khurana and Kim (2003) explain, this test is 
appropriate for comparing the relative informativeness of two mutually exclusive 
measures since it compares the R-squared of one model with the R-squared of another, 
non-nested model and identifies the one with the greater explanatory power. If the test 
results in a positive and significant Z-statistic, the book value model exhibits more 
explanatory power and therefore book values of reclassified assets possess higher value 
relevance for investors than fair values. In order to compare investors’ valuation of 
book values for the different types of reclassification (H3), a Wald test for equality of 
coefficients is employed.  
5. Sample Description 
5.1 Sample Selection 
The databases Datastream and Compustat are used to identify European banks that 
prepared their 2008 financial statements under IFRS. All banks that are subsidiaries of 
other banks present in the sample, for which no annual report could be found on the 
banks’ homepage in the English, German or French language, that do not prepare 
                                                
10 Kolev (2009), who examines quarterly reports of US banks, works in a quite similar fashion by using 
the closing price of common stock one day after the Form 10-Q filing (see also Goh et al., 2009).  
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consolidated IFRS financial statements and those that were not publicly traded by the 
end of the financial year 2008 are excluded. This proceeding yields a sample of 163 
banks before data collection. 
In a next step, the sample is partitioned into 81 reclassifying and 79 non-reclassifying 
banks by verifying if they made use of the reclassifications in the 2008 financial 
statements. Three banks are excluded due to opaque disclosures concerning financial 
instruments. Furthermore, 11 banks are identified that exclusively reclassified assets out 
of the category HFT into AFS. This implies that book values still equal fair values 
rendering these banks futile for the study. Accordingly, the number of reclassifying 
banks is reduced to 70. As previously explained, MVE is measured at the end of the first 
trading day after the report’s publication date. If the publication date could neither be 
found on the investor relations homepage nor in the respective financial report itself, an 
email was sent to the investor relations department. However, if none of the described 
sources allows an identification of the publication date the bank is excluded from the 
sample. Furthermore, unavailability of variables data (BVE and NI are obtained from 
Worldscope,11 while MVE is obtained from Datastream) in the databases leads to a final 
sample of 56 reclassifying banks from 19 different European countries. For these banks 
book and fair values of reclassified assets are manually collected from the Q3 2008 – 
Q1 2010 reports, yielding a final, unbalanced sample of 189 observations.12 Table 2 
illustrates the sample selection process in more detail. 
[Insert Table 2 here] 
To mitigate the effect of extreme outliers, all continuous variables are winsorized at the 
98 percent level. 62 (112) observations take on a value of one for the variable 
COMPLEX (STOXX). 
5.2 Descriptive Statistics 
Panel A of Table 3 presents descriptive statistics on the variables. 
                                                
11 In order to avoid a further downsizing of the sample, for a small number of cases where net income 
data was not available through Worldscope it is collected manually from the reports. 
12 For 10 observations only the aggregated reporting date values for the new category are disclosed 
without being partitioned according to the category of origin. In order to avoid losing these observations, 
the assumption is made that the reclassification type which was used most extensively in terms of 
volumes represents the only reclassification, i.e. the values for this reclassification type correspond to the 
aggregated values while the other reclassification type values are set to zero. 
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[Insert Table 3 here] 
The mean of MVE (14.103) is smaller than the mean of BVE (19.069), which indicates 
that investors value the book value of equity with a discount. The comparison between 
the mean of BVEnet (-0.375) and the mean of BVE suggests that the book value of all 
reclassified assets is higher than BVE. The mean of BVAFSLAR (FVAFSLAR) of 13.615 
(13.205) shows that the reclassification from the AFS into the LAR category was used 
most extensively in terms of reclassified amounts.  
In Panel B of Table 3 the mean BV and FV for the reclassified amounts and their Diff 
are depicted in relation to the number of shares outstanding as well as in relation to the 
book value of equity. The mean is calculated by using the total number of observations 
(N=189) and additionally by using exclusively the number of observations that actually 
contain the respective reclassification. The average difference of SumBV and SumFV 
when deflated by BVE is 0.038, i.e. the average difference of the book and fair values of 
all reclassified assets equals approximately 3.8 percent of the book value of equity. 
Reclassifications from the AFS into the LAR category result in the highest average 
difference between the respective book and fair values among the three forms of 
reclassifications. 
Table 4 shows Pearson and Spearman correlations among the variables.  
[Insert Table 4 here] 
The comparison of the correlations between the dependent variable MVE and the 
respective BV and FV measures shows that in a univariate sense the book values of 
HFTHTM seem to possess higher relative value relevance than the fair values with a 
Pearson correlation of 0.6419 vs. 0.5957. For the other cases with statistical significance 
the correlations between MVE and the respective BV and FV measures are almost 
identical. In regards of incremental value relevance, especially the Pearson correlations 
show a quite surprising picture. All Diff variables are positively correlated with MVE, 
which is contrary to the relationship hypothesized under H2. With a statistical 
significant value of 0.7333 this relationship is most pronounced for DiffHFTHTM. In 
some cases, correlations between independent variables are both high and significant, 
which is especially true for the correlations between BVEnet and some of the 
reclassification variables. Notably, the size of the Pearson correlation between BVEnet 
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and all AFSLAR variables indicate collinearity, which might be detrimental to the 
statistical significance of the regression coefficient estimates. There is scant significance 
in the correlations between NI and the other independent variables, and if so, 
correlations are small to moderate. The same holds for the correlations between the 
reclassification variables both for BV and FV, with the exception of the Spearman 
correlation between BVAFSLAR (FVAFSLAR) and BVHFTHTM (FVHFTHTM) with a 
comparably high value of -0.5240 (-0.5216). 
6. Results 
6.1 Relative and incremental value relevance  
Table 5 presents the regression results for the book and fair value model specifications.   
[Insert Table 5 here] 
The adjusted R-squared values exceeding 92 percent for both models are fairly high. 
Except for the control variables all coefficients possess the predicted sign, are 
significant and of a reasonable magnitude.13 The coefficients of the variables 
representing book and fair values of reclassified assets all are significant at the one 
percent level. The Vuong's Z-statistic of 2.2352 at a significance level of five percent 
suggests that the book value model is more informative than the fair value model. This 
result supports hypothesis H1a that book values of reclassified financial instruments 
possess a higher explanatory power in explaining equity values than disclosed fair 
values. The lack of statistical significance for COMPLEX indicates that voluntary 
disclosures about the types of reclassified assets do not exhibit any influence. 
To further examine the question whether the results on relative informativeness differ 
between the reclassification types, the fair value model is altered in a way that all 
reclassification variables are kept at book values except for the variable of interest.14 In 
a first step, this is done separately for each type of reclassification. Thereafter, the fair 
value model is altered so that both variables for reclassifications into LAR (AFSLAR 
and HFTLAR) are measured at fair values at the same time. Finally, the two different 
categories of origin (HFT vs. AFS) are regarded separately.  
[Insert Table 6 here] 
                                                
13 For further analysis regarding additional control variables see section 6.3. 
14 See also Khurana and Kim (2003). 
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The FV model for the AFSLAR reclassification generates estimation coefficients for the 
continuous variables that possess the expected sign and are significant at the one and 
five percent level, respectively. Again, none of the control variables exhibits a statistical 
significant influence. Interestingly in contrast to the results for all financial instruments 
collectively, here the Vuong test does not suggest that one measure is superior to the 
other in terms of relative informativeness. The FV model for HFTLAR yields quite 
similar results regarding the estimation coefficients. Also, the Vuong test does not allow 
for a conclusion regarding the relative informativeness. The HFTHTM models show a 
different picture. Here, the Vuong test with a Z-statistic of 3.5734 at the one percent 
significance level strongly suggests that book values possess higher relative 
informativeness than their fair value counterparts. The results of the FVLAR model 
regarding the estimated coefficients do not materially differ from the FVAFSLAR and 
FVHFTLAR models. Also, the Vuong test does not indicate with statistical significance 
that one measure is superior in terms of relative informativeness. Finally, the Vuong test 
of the FVHFT model with a Z-statistic of 3.3441 at the one percent significance level 
here strongly favors the book value model, which seems to be primarily driven by the 
reclassifications into HTM. 
Before further interpreting these results, the observations that do not contain the 
respective reclassification of interest are excluded as an additional analysis. For 
example, when regarding assets reclassified from AFS into LAR, the regression only 
includes observations with a value different than zero for the variables BVAFSLAR and 
FVAFSLAR. Hence, the number of observations differs according to the type of 
reclassification under review in the separate models. This proceeding also leads to the 
rather small number of 69 observations for the HFTHTM model. The outcomes of this 
analysis are reported at the bottom of Table 6. Taken together, the results do not 
materially differ from the ones obtained by using the total number of 189 observations, 
which renders them more robust. However, the Z-statistic regarding the HFTHTM 
models decreases to the ten percent significance level, probably as an outcome of the 
reduced sample size. 
When comparing the three types of reclassifications, the HFTHTM model is the only 
one where the Vuong test suggests that book values are of higher relevance to investors 
than fair values. These observed differences between reclassification types provide 
support for H1b and especially for the notion that the conveyance of private information 
 87 
is most credible for reclassifications into HTM. When looking at the two categories of 
origin, the Vuong test yields statistically significant evidence for the higher explanatory 
power of book values exclusively for HFT. However, none of the Vuong tests results in 
a Z-statistic with a negative value, i.e. none of the model specifications suggests that 
fair values possess a higher value relevance compared to book values. This indicates 
that investors do not perceive the reclassification as earnings management.  
Table 7 presents the results regarding the incremental value relevance of fair values. 
[Insert Table 7 here] 
The estimated coefficients for DiffAFSLAR and DiffHFTLAR possess the predicted 
negative sign but they are not statistically significant. This leads to the conclusion that 
the fair values are not incrementally value relevant. In contrast, the significance at the 
one percent level for the coefficient of DiffHFTHTM (2.7366) indicates that here fair 
value disclosures are incrementally value relevant. The positive sign implies the 
following relationship: The lower the fair values compared to the book values, the 
higher is the market value of equity. Taken together the results do not support H2. This 
outcome raises some doubts about the usefulness of the required fair value disclosures 
for the reclassified financial instruments and can be seen as a confirmation of the notion 
that investors react positively to the reclassifications: Not only are book values to some 
extent superior to fair values in terms of relative value relevance but the fair value 
disclosures also seem to be at least partly neglected as a source of incremental 
information. Moreover, in the case were the disclosures are of incremental value 
relevance, investors seem to be strongly favoring the reclassification decision, which is 
indicated by the positive sign of the estimated coefficient of DiffHFTHTM. 
The results of the test for differences in the pricing of book values are reported in Table 
8: 
[Insert Table 8 here] 
The null hypothesis of the Wald test states that the coefficients of two reclassification 
variables are equal. For the comparison of BVHFTLAR (0.6244) vs. BVHFTHTM 
(0.8810) the test rejects the null hypothesis. This result suggests that investors impound 
financial assets reclassified from HFT into LAR at a lower multiple than those 
reclassified into HTM. A possible explanation for this outcome again is the higher 
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credibility of the HTM category. However, the fact that the coefficients of BVAFSLAR 
(0.7873) and BVHFTHTM are not materially different does not reinforce this 
explanation. When comparing the coefficients of BVAFSLAR vs. BVHFTLAR the null 
hypothesis is also rejected. This outcome indicates that the reclassification from HFT 
into LAR induces the highest discount by investors. These findings support H3 since 
overall investors do differentiate in their pricing of book values between the types of 
reclassification. 
6.2 Influence of the stage of the financial crisis on value relevance  
In order to examine the influence of the financial crisis, the sample is partitioned into 
two subsamples according to the time periods Q3 2008 until Q2 2009 and Q3 2009 until 
Q1 2010. The performance of the Stoxx® Europe 600 Banks Index is the basis for this 
partitioning: After having reached its lowest point on 9 March 2009 since the beginning 
of the crisis, the index recovered in a slow but continuous manner. However, Q1 and Q2 
2009 are still included in the crisis period in order to incorporate the time period needed 
by investors to realize that the market is actually recovering in a sustainable fashion.  
Table 9 depicts the results of the models when calculated for the two different time 
periods. 
[Insert Table 9 here] 
The coefficients of the continuous variables are identical in terms of sign and 
significance levels across the two periods. Interestingly, the coefficient of NI is an 
exception since it is only of statistical significance for the recovery period models and 
here it increases considerably in size compared to the full sample results. This outcome 
is probably due to an increase of investors’ confidence in the sustainability of the 
reported net income when comparing the recovery to the crisis period. The results of the 
relative value relevance comparison indicate that only for the recovery period book 
values possess a higher informativeness (Z-statistic of 4.0658). This outcome reveals 
that the superiority of reclassified assets’ book values in terms of relative value 
relevance differs during and after the peak of the crisis (H4). Besides higher levels of 
noise during the crisis period which might be causal for these findings, another 
explanation is that with the passing of time, investors care less and less about the 
original purpose of the financial instruments. The fair value information therefore 
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becomes less and less relevant since the instruments are neither held for the purpose of 
trading nor available for sale. This effect seems to outweigh the presumed increase in 
the reliability of the fair values due to the return of functioning, active markets. 
Moreover, as laid out in the development of H4, if the effects on the regulatory capital 
would exhibit an influence on the value relevance, the superiority of book values would 
be of higher significance for the crisis period. However, since the findings indicate the 
opposite, it can be concluded that the outcomes on value relevance do not seem to be 
particularly driven by regulatory capital effects.  
While the Vuong test does not indicate a higher informativeness of book values for the 
crisis period, it also does not favor the fair value model. This outcome does not impede 
the inference drawn from the results under H1a, namely that investors do not perceive 
the reclassification as earnings management. If such a perception would be prevailing 
than the outcome of the Vuong test would suggest the superiority of fair values.15 
6.3 Additional analysis  
As an additional analysis, the fair value models and the difference model are estimated 
by adjusting NI for the quarterly (other comprehensive) income effects that arise from 
the reclassifications. However, it has to be highlighted that due to the very 
heterogeneous nature or even complete lack of disclosures in this regard, the performed 
adjustment presents a mere proxy of the actual effect for a substantial number of 
observations. Although IFRS 7.12A requires to disclose fair value gains or losses that 
would have been resulted without the reclassification, this piece of information is not 
provided consistently on a quarterly basis. Also, in some cases the additional impact on 
the (other comprehensive) income resulting from the reclassification is specified, 
whereas in other cases only the hypothetical gain or loss that would have resulted is 
provided without a specification of the actual number, which renders it impossible to 
determine the net effect. Moreover, in some reports the effect is shown in a cumulative 
manner. There are also cases where the information is exclusively disclosed in the 
annual reports and therefore the numbers on the reclassification effect relate to the 
whole financial year and not to the previous quarter. Moreover, some banks report the 
effect before taxes, while others report it net of taxes or do not give any specifications 
                                                
15 Following Rogers (1993), I additionally calculate all OLS regressions models with heteroskedasticity-
robust standard errors clustered by bank. With the exception of H3, this proceeding does not lead to 
qualitative changes of the results. Regarding H3, the results fail to provide evidence for significant 
differences between the investors’ pricing of reclassified financial instrument book values. 
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about taxes at all. Finally, several reports do not allow to allocate the effect according to 
the different reclassification types since it is only detailed on an aggregated level. These 
restrictions on the available data render it necessary to apply proxy techniques, which 
are summarized in the following: If possible, cumulative effects are disentangled by 
using the cumulative data of the respective preceding reports. No adjustments are made 
for tax effects. For the observations where no information about the effect of the 
reclassification on the (other comprehensive) income can be obtained, this effect is set 
to zero. Finally, if the effect cannot be allocated to the different reclassification types, 
the aggregated effect is allocated to the type that is most extensively used in terms of 
reclassified volumes for the respective observation. Due to these approximations, the 
results have to be interpreted cautiously and are not tabulated.  
When adjusting NI the inferences from the main analysis do not change with two 
exceptions concerning H1a and H1b.16 H1a is not supported any more since here the 
Vuong test is still positive but now lacks statistical significance. H1b is still supported 
overall, although the Vuong test for the comparison of the BVHFT und FVHFT models 
is still positive but now lacks statistical significance. However, the results of the Vuong 
test for the HFTHTM models that exclusively contain observations with HFTHTM 
reclassifications is now statistically significant at the five instead of the 10 percent level. 
Other results regarding the reclassification from HFT into HTM do not change and 
therefore the main inferences drawn from the analysis on H1b still apply.  
As an additional control for country differences the dummy variable EU, which equals 
one if the bank’s country of origin belongs to the EU and zero otherwise, is included. 
However, except for the incremental value relevance of the fair value disclosures (H2) 
this modification does not have any material effect on the results. Here, the estimated 
coefficient for DiffAFSLAR possesses the predicted negative sign and is now 
statistically significant at the five percent level.17 This indicates that although fair values 
of AFSLAR are not superior to book values, the fair value information is still 
incrementally relevant and investors perceive high differences between book and fair 
values negatively. This result lends some support to hypothesis H2, which still cannot 
be supported by the findings on the coefficients on DiffHFTLAR and DiffHFTHTM. 
                                                
16 The same holds when additionally adjusting for income effects that arise from the reclassifications 
from HFT into AFS. 
17 The same holds when using no control variables at all. 
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Overall EU is of statistical significance only in three of the regression models used 
throughout the analysis. This might be due to the fact that EU takes a value of zero for 
only 35 of the 189 observations.18  
Following Kolev (2009), I additionally include a control for size because previous 
research documents that the business model and information environment of financial 
institutions is affected by their size (e.g., Khurana and Kim, 2003; Nissim and Penman, 
2007). I use deciles of the equity market value in Euros as proxy for size. Furthermore, 
in order to control for pricing-differences between loss-reporting and other firms (e.g. 
Hayn, 1995; Collins et al., 1999), I construct a binary variable that equals one if a 
bank’s reported net income is negative and zero otherwise. While I find that solely the 
size variable exhibits statistically significant positive influence on MVE (mostly at the 
five percent level), the results regarding H1a become even stronger. The Vuong's Z-
statistic of 2.5999 is now significant at the one percent level reinforcing the notion that 
book values of reclassified financial instruments possess a higher explanatory power 
than disclosed fair values. Furthermore, the findings provide additional evidence for H3. 
In contrast to the main analysis, the null hypothesis that BVAFSLAR (0.7762) and 
BVHFTHTM (0.9846) are equal is rejected by the Wald test at the ten percent level. 
Accordingly, the Wald test null hypothesis is now rejected in all three variable 
comparisons, which strongly indicates that investors do differentiate in their pricing of 
reclassified instruments’ book values (H3). Among the three forms of reclassifications, 
investors price assets reclassified into HTM highest. Also, I find some minor variations 
regarding H4 in comparison to the main analysis. While the results for the recovery 
period remain qualitatively unchanged (Z-statistic of 3.9550), the Vuong test yields a 
marginally significant positive Z-statistic of 1.8526 for the crisis period. However, the 
difference in magnitude and statistical significance of the Z-statistic still support H4, i.e. 
that the superiority of reclassified assets’ book values in terms of relative value 
relevance differs during and after the peak of the crisis. 
As a final robustness test, all models are calculated without the variable NI in order to 
exclude any bias that might result from the inclusion of negative net income figures. 
However, omitting the variable NI does not change the results qualitatively. The only 
exception concerns the incremental value relevance of the fair value disclosures (H2). 
                                                
18 The same holds when using EU-15 instead of EU. 
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Here the results correspond to the ones obtained by the introduction of EU as a control 
variable. 
7. Conclusion 
This paper examines the value relevance of book and disclosed fair values for financial 
instruments reclassified under the IAS 39 amendment during the financial crisis. Using 
a sample of European banks for the period Q3 2008 until Q1 2010 evidence for the 
higher relative informativeness of book values is provided. Furthermore, when 
partitioning the reclassified amounts according to the type of reclassification, the higher 
explanatory power of book values is found to be especially distinct for the amounts 
transferred from HFT into HTM. None of the results for the different reclassification 
types suggests that fair values possess higher relative value relevance. Also, disclosed 
fair value information is not incrementally value relevant beyond book values to 
investors for two of the three reclassification types. For the reclassification from HFT 
into HTM, fair values are incrementally value relevant in a way that also reinforces the 
notion that investors are favoring the reclassification decision. Furthermore, the type of 
reclassification exhibits an influence on the pricing of reclassified assets’ book values, 
revealing that the reclassification from HFT into LAR is perceived as least credible. 
Finally, evidence is provided that the superiority of book values in terms of relative 
informativeness is more pronounced during times of recovery than during the peak of 
the financial crisis. 
Taken together, the findings indicate that despite their explicit earnings management 
implication, investors reacted positively to the reclassifications under IAS 39. The 
reclassifications were therefore useful in order to convey private information from the 
financial statement preparers to investors, whereas the credibility of this information 
seems to be positively impacted by rules that penalize opportunistic behavior, for 
example the so called tainting rules according to IAS 39.9 for HTM financial 
instruments.  
Besides of the contribution these results present for the fair value relevance literature, 
they additionally provide some useful implications regarding IFRS 9, which is 
designated by the IASB to replace IAS 39 in the year 2015 but is still awaiting EU 
endorsement. IFRS 9.A4.1.2 defines the business model test as one of two prerequisites 
for the application of the amortized cost method and thereby makes use of the typical 
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characteristics of a HTM instrument: Accordingly, the amortized cost method can be 
applied if the objective of the entity's business model is to hold the financial asset to 
collect the contractual cash flows rather than to sell it prior to its contractual maturity to 
realize fair value changes. If the objective of the business model changes subsequent 
reclassifications are allowed (IFRS 9.A4.4.1). However, reclassifications are neither 
limited to “rare circumstances“ nor is the credibility of the reported change in the 
business model reinforced by tainting rules. Since the results of this paper suggest that 
investors perceive these features favourably the absence of them should be put into 
question. 
Limitations inherent to this paper include assumptions implicitly made by using the 
modified Ohlson (1995) model, which does not consider any other source of 
information than accounting data. Especially for the crisis period it can be argued that 
the dependent variable MVE is influenced by numerous other factors. Furthermore, the 
partly very high correlations among some independent variables might run the risk of 
causing collinearity problems. Due to the voluntary character of the disclosures 
regarding the types of reclassified assets, the use of the control variable COMPLEX 
might also be subject to self-selection bias. Finally, another limitation inherent to the 
design of the study is the comparably small sample size, which is especially true for the 
analysis of the differences in pricing during the two time periods. 
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The Role of Fair Values in the Pricing of Audit Services - Evidence from European 
Banks  
 
This study analyzes whether and how financial instruments’ fair values in European 
IFRS bank financial statements exhibit an influence on audit fees. We first examine fair 
values along two dimensions and provide evidence that audit fees increase with a higher 
exposure to the first dimension, i.e. the number of IAS 39 fair value instrument 
categories used by banks. We next find that the second dimension, i.e. fair value 
financial assets and liabilities deflated by total assets, does not exhibit any influence on 
audit fees. When further partitioning this measure according to the three IAS 39 fair 
values levels, we find evidence that audit fees increase with level 3 assets and liabilities, 
which we attribute to lower reliability and higher complexity of these fair values. 
Furthermore, we analyze whether the influence of fair values on audit fees is dependent 
on the IAS 39 financial instruments category. However, the results do not support this 
notion. Finally, our evidence shows that banks which carry out financial instrument 
reclassifications under the IAS 39 amendment exhibit higher audit fees than other 
banks. Our results are robust to a host of robustness tests including principal component 
factoring. Overall, the findings suggest that while specific types of fair value are 
associated with higher audit fees, fair value measurement per se is not. 
 
Keywords: Audit fees, fair value, reclassification, IAS 39, IFRS 7 
JEL Classification: G21, M41, M42
 110 
1. Introduction 
Using mostly hand-collected data for a sample of IFRS reporting banks for the period 
2009 and 2010, this paper examines the determinants of European banks’ audit fees and 
the role of fair values. To this end, we first build a base model with general and bank-
specific determinants of audit fees. In a next step we construct two alternative measures 
of a bank’s general fair value exposure, namely the number of different IAS 39 fair 
value financial instrument categories used by a bank and the proportion of fair value 
financial instruments to total assets. To disentangle effects arising from different fair 
value types, we further partition this measure according to the three IAS 39 fair values 
levels. In addition, we analyze whether the influence of fair values on audit fees varies 
between the different IAS 39 financial instruments categories. Finally, we seek to 
determine whether financial instrument reclassifications carried out under the IAS 39 
amendment have an influence on audit fees.  
Our results consistently show that audit fees increase with an increasing number of 
different IAS 39 fair value financial instrument categories used by a bank representing 
our first fair value dimension. However, unlike Ettredge et al. (2011) we do not find any 
evidence that the second dimension, i.e. fair value financial assets and liabilities 
deflated by total assets, exhibits an influence on audit fees. In line with prior literature, 
we also provide evidence that audit fees increase with level 3 assets and liabilities, 
which we attribute to lower reliability and higher complexity of these fair values. 
Furthermore, the findings do not suggest that the influence of fair value financial 
instruments on audit fees differs between the IAS 39 categories. Finally, our evidence 
shows that banks carrying out financial instrument reclassifications under the IAS 39 
amendment exhibit higher audit fees, compared to other banks. We argue that this 
increase is due to potential earnings management implications and the incremental audit 
effort induced by these reclassifications. The results are robust to a host of robustness 
tests such as principal component factoring and alternative sets of proxy variables. 
Taken together, our findings lead us to conclude that the assessment of economic costs 
associated with fair value accounting requires a differentiated view, as the impact on 
audit fees differs across certain characteristics of fair values. 
Our paper contributes to the fair value literature by providing evidence on the costs 
associated with fair value accounting. We examine these costs in the form of observable 
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audit fees. According to the theory of Jensen and Meckling (1976) audit fees represent 
agency costs, or more specifically, monitoring costs borne by shareholders in order to 
monitor the firm’s management. During the decades-long debate about fair value 
accounting, various effects and implications of this measurement concept have been 
examined. Examples include value relevance studies (e.g., Barth, 1994), papers that 
analyze the effect of fair value accounting on earnings volatility (e.g., Fiechter, 2011b) 
and on information asymmetry (e.g., Ball et al., 2012). However, with the exception of 
Chen et al. (2010), Ettredge et al. (2011), and Goncharov et al. (2013), the audit fee 
implications of fair values remain largely unexplored up to the present. The results of 
the former two studies show that audit fees increase with the exposure to fair values, 
measured as the proportion of fair value financial instruments to total assets. 
Furthermore, they identify level 3 fair values, i.e. less verifiable and more complex fair 
values, as the main driver of this increase, which is in line with our results. While their 
settings are similar to ours in that the authors also analyze audit fees in the banking 
sector, they differentiate from our study in the underlying institutional environment and 
the accounting standards examined since they regard US GAAP reporting US banks. 
Moreover, our study introduces an alternative interpretation regarding the definition of 
fair value exposure and it is innovative in addressing the questions whether the impact 
of fair values on audit fees differs within the IAS 39 fair value categories and how 
reclassifications between categories affect audit fees. Analyzing European real estate 
firms, the institutional environment and accounting standards in Goncharov et al. (2013) 
are consistent with ours. However, they regard an industry that is hardly comparable to 
the banking sector and its regulatory environment. Unlike the US studies, Goncharov et 
al. (2013) find a negative relationship between audit fees and the fair value exposure, 
which they attribute, inter alia, to economies of scale that arise from auditing the fair 
value estimation process instead of individual estimates. Given the ambiguous as well 
as limited extant literature, the question whether and to what extent fair values affect the 
pricing of audit fees requires further study. To the best of the authors’ knowledge, this is 
the first paper providing evidence on the impact of fair values on banks’ audit fees in an 
IFRS context. Moreover, our evidence regarding the effect of IAS 39 reclassifications 
on audit fees complements some recent work on the reclassification behavior of 
European banks (e.g., Bischof et al., 2011) and the value relevance of reclassified 
financial instruments (Schneider, 2012). We contribute to this strand of literature by 
shedding some light on the audit costs associated with these reclassifications. 
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Furthermore, we are not aware of any other paper that investigates determinants of 
European IFRS reporting banks’ audit fees. This research void is quite surprising given 
the important role external auditors play in regulatory oversight of banks. Regulatory 
agencies evaluate banks’ financial health on the basis of audited financial statements 
and risk measures. Consequently, auditors that do not adequately factor fundamental 
risks into their audit function might jeopardize the banking system as a whole (Fields et 
al., 2004). The recent financial crisis made the relevance of this issue evident when 
some voices also questioned the work performed by auditors (e.g., Sikka, 2009). In the 
aftermath of the financial crisis, the European Commision (2010) issued the much 
debated green paper on audit policy entitled “Audit Policy: Lessons from the Crisis”.1 
Several of the regulating proposals in the green paper possess direct or indirect 
implications on audit fees in the European Union. In order to evaluate such proposals it 
is crucial to gain an understanding of how auditors price their services. Focussing on the 
European bank audit market, our empirical analysis provides valuable evidence in this 
regard. 
Finally, against the backdrop of the recent financial crisis, the influence of fair values 
on audit fees is especially worthwhile to be analyzed. During the crisis, the issue of 
determining and hence auditing fair values came to the public attention. Due to distorted 
and dried up markets, an increasing number of fair values had to be determined based 
on financial models making additional guidance on how to audit these fair values 
necessary (e.g., International Auditing and Assurance Standards Board, 2008).2 By 
analyzing the period 2009-2010, this paper provides evidence on how the auditing 
profession factors fair values into the pricing of its services after these events. 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 presents an overview of 
the standards and regulations we draw upon in our analyses regarding audit fee and fair 
value data. The third section provides an overview of the related literature and describes 
the development of the hypotheses. Section 4 presents the research design, while section 
5 describes the sample. Section 6 discusses the results of the empirical tests and the 
final section 7 provides a conclusion. 
 
                                                
1 See Humphrey et al. (2011) for a critical discussion. 
2 Moreover, fair value accounting was accused of having a procyclical effect and therefore aggravating 
the crisis (see for example Laux and Leuz (2010) for a discussion). 
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2. Institutional Background 
According to article 49 of the Directive 2006/43/EC (European Commission, 2006a), 
entities in the European Union are required to disclose audit fees and fees paid to the 
auditor for non-audit services in the notes to the annual accounts and the consolidated 
accounts. For financial years beginning on or after 1 January 2009, IFRS 7.27B requires 
entities to disclose the fair value hierarchy level for each class of financial instruments 
for which fair value measurements are recognized in the statement of financial position. 
IFRS 7.27A defines these levels in the following way: 
• Level 1 fair values are quoted prices in active markets for identical assets or 
liabilities 
• Level 2 fair values are determined based on directly or indirectly observable 
inputs 
• Level 3 fair values are determined using unobservable inputs 
 In our analysis regarding the different categories of fair value financial instruments we 
relate to the five categories as set out in IAS 39.9. These are financial assets and 
liabilities held for trading, financial assets and liabilities designated as at fair value 
through profit or loss (fair value option) as well as available-for-sale financial assets. 
The reclassification amendment to IAS 39 (International Accounting Standards Board, 
2008) enabled entities to carry out reclassifications between the different financial 
instrument categories under certain circumstances (IAS 39.50-54). While these 
reclassifications allow to abandon fair value measurement in favor of historical cost 
accounting, they come along with additional disclosure requirements as laid out in IFRS 
7.12A. These disclosures include for example the fair value gain or loss that would have 
been recognized if the financial assets had not been reclassified. According to IFRS 
7.31 ff., entities shall disclose information about the nature and extent of risks arising 
from financial instruments, e.g., liquidity risk. We further elaborate on these risk 
disclosures in our research design section where we define our risk proxy variables. 
3. Related literature and hypotheses development 
In his seminal work, Simunic (1980) develops a theoretical model that explains the 
auditor’s pricing decision. Accordingly, this decision is a function of the auditor’s cost, 
i.e. the resources used for the audit including a provision for a normal profit, and the 
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expected value of future losses that may arise from the audited financial statements 
(e.g., losses from litigation). Simunic (1980) states that the auditor’s liability loss 
exposure is, inter alia, determined by the size of the client, the complexity of its 
operations, and auditing problems associated with certain financial statement 
components. The results of his empirical analysis show that these determinants exhibit 
the predicted influence on audit fees. Subsequent research building upon the theoretical 
and empirical findings of Simunic (1980) identifies client size, client risk, and client 
complexity as the most important drivers of audit fees (see Hay et al. (2006) and Hay 
(2013) for meta-analyses). In our model, we use different variables to control for these 
drivers, as elaborated in more detail in the research design section.  
According to Simunic (1980), auditing problems that arise from certain financial 
statement components increase the auditor’s loss exposure and therefore audit fees. We 
argue that fair value assets and liabilities belong to this group of financial statement 
components. Prior literature identifies a number of important issues that render auditing 
of fair value measurements difficult. First, unlike the more uniform control systems 
applied to conventional transaction processes, the client’s estimation processes and 
related internal controls over fair value measurements are more prone to be developed 
on an individual basis. Constant variations in innovative financial instruments cause 
frequent changes in fair value estimation methods, accompanied by the introduction of 
new valuation models and changing assumptions. This increases audit work and 
requires specialized valuation expertise (Martin et al., 2006). Audit teams usually lack 
this expertise and thus request assistance from valuation assurance specialists leading to 
higher audit costs.3 Second, auditing of fair values is further complicated by cognitive 
biases and errors inherent in preparing these measurements (e.g., Simon 1955, 1956; 
Martin et al., 2006). For instance, Russo and Schoemaker (2002) show that individuals’ 
confidence increases with the amount of information available to them. The estimation 
of fair values is oftentimes set in environments with tremendous quantities of 
information, thus making preparers more prone to overconfidence issues. As a result, 
they may not take additional decision relevant factors into account. In sum, cognitive 
biases demand more effort from the audit teams since they need to adjust for such biases 
when assessing the fair value measurements, thereby leading to higher audit costs.  
                                                
3 On the other hand, a different problem might arise from audit team leaders’ lack of incentives to apply 
for support in valuation issues, which, in turn, results in higher audit risks (United States Securities and 
Exchange Commission, 2008). 
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However, a competing view suggests that fair values allow, compared to alternative 
accounting measurement concepts, a less effortful auditing process, as firms set up 
standardized procedures to determine fair values (Goncharov et al., 2013). Hence, the 
auditors’ work is concentrated on routine checks of the underlying model inputs and 
assumptions. 
On the empirical side and consistent with the arguments presented above, Ettredge et al. 
(2011) document a positive association between audit fees and fair value exposure for 
US banks,4 while Gonchorav et al. (2013) find opposing results for their sample of 
European IFRS reporting real estate firms. Ettredge et al. (2011) complement the audit 
fee model by Fields et al. (2004) with their experimental variables. In their study of US 
banks Fields et al. (2004) identify different risk-related characteristics as drivers for 
banks’ audit fees. Their model captures the five risk-categories liquidity, operating, 
credit, capital and market risk. They find that with the exception of market risk all other 
risk factors influence the fees charged by auditors. We extend the approach of Ettredge 
et al. (2011) by arguing that the banks’ general exposure to fair value is not only 
captured by the relative proportion of total instruments measured at fair value, but also 
by the number of employed fair value categories, thus allowing for a new interpretation 
of exposure. Hence, we capture the banks’ fair value exposure along two dimensions.  
Guided by the deliberations above, and considering that, like Ettredge et al. (2011), our 
study is set in a banking environment, we expect that audit fees increase with the 
general fair exposure leading to the following hypotheses (stated in the alternative 
form):  
H1a: Audit fees increase with the number of different fair value categories. 
H1b: Audit fees are higher for banks with a higher proportion of financial 
instruments at fair value. 
As stated above, we hypothesize that fair value financial instruments increase the 
auditor’s loss exposure and consequentially audit fees. However, the fact that fair value 
determination methods vary significantly due to financial instruments’ characteristics 
calls for a more differentiated view. When determining fair values, management must 
                                                
4 See also De George et al. (2013) who find in their analysis of Australian companies that the adoption of 
IFRS is associated with an increase in audit fees. Among other explanations they attribute this finding, in 
part, to the widespread use of fair values under IFRS. 
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adhere to the main principle of the fair value hierarchy, i.e. the “primacy of market-
based measures” (Hitz, 2007, p. 326). The decreasing quantity and quality of market-
based inputs from level 1 to 3 is accompanied by a decreasing verifiability of resulting 
fair values (Hitz, 2007). Consequentially, obtaining appropriate audit evidence relating 
to the valuation of level 3 fair values requires considerably more effort from auditors 
compared to level 1 fair values: While it is comparably easy to verify quoted prices in 
active markets (level 1), fair value estimates based on models render the verification 
process more complex. Additional audit procedures induced by level 3 fair values 
include understanding the underlying estimation model and checking the plausibility 
and reliability of input data (Ramos and Delahanty, 1998). Since the models are 
potentially inaccurate and their inputs subject to managerial discretion (e.g., Landsman, 
2007), the potential measurement error inherent to these models-based fair values is 
significantly greater compared to level 1 and even level 2 fair values (Goh et al., 2009). 
This in turn leads to an increased auditor’s loss exposure, which according to Simunic 
(1980),5 results in an increase of audit fees (Ettredge et al., 2011).  
Furthermore, the use of level 3 fair values is also accompanied by supplemental 
disclosure requirements, thereby further increasing the number of audit procedures. 
According to IFRS 7.27B an entity shall disclose the assumptions for level 3 fair value 
measurements and a sensitivity analysis documenting the effects of model input 
variations on profit and loss and other comprehensive income.6  
In accordance with the deliberations above, Chen et al. (2010), Ettredge et al. (2011), 
and Goncharov et al. (2013) provide empirical evidence for the US banking and the 
European real estate industry, respectively, that audit fees increase in the firm’s 
exposure to more difficult-to-audit level 3 fair values. In a similar vein, Goh et al. 
(2009), Kolev (2009), and Song et al. (2010), examine the value relevance of fair value 
information. The three studies consistently show that level 3 fair values are less value 
relevant to investors than level 1 fair values. In their analysis of equity betas, Riedl and 
Serafeim (2011) provide evidence that an increasing level 3 fair value exposure leads to 
                                                
5 See also Bell and Griffin (2012) who cite the case of New Century TRS Holdings, Inc. to demonstrate 
how auditors can suffer from litigation losses as a consequence of auditing high-uncertainty fair value 
estimates. 
6 In economic terms, the effects from variations in the fair value model inputs can be highly significant. 
Using publicly available data, Christensen et al. (2012) show that changes within reasonable ranges result 
in substantial changes to accounting values, oftentimes exceeding the average materiality threshold by 
far. 
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an increase of a firm’s cost of capital that is significantly higher compared to level 1 and 
level 2 fair values. In an earlier working paper version, Riedl and Serafeim (2009) show 
that information asymmetry, proxied by bid-ask spreads, increases with an increasing 
level 3 fair value exposure. Finally, Valencia (2011) as well as Fiechter and Meyer 
(2011) demonstrate that Level 3 fair values are exposed to higher earnings management, 
thus increasing audit risk and rendering the verification process more demanding for 
auditors. 
The sum of the considerations lead to the following hypothesis (stated in the alternative 
form): 
H2: The influence of financial instruments at fair value on audit fees is more 
pronounced for less verifiable fair values. 
Moreover, we argue that differences in the required audit effort, and hence in the audit 
fees, arise from peculiarities of the different fair value categories defined in IAS 39.9. 
According to these definitions, financial instruments have to be categorized as held for 
trading if their main purpose is to be sold or repurchased in the near term or if they 
belong to a portfolio with a pattern of short-term profit taking. Both cases imply a short-
term holding period.7 As a consequence, we assume the turnover rate of held-for-trading 
financial instruments to be considerably higher in comparison to financial instruments 
in the fair value option and available-for-sale categories, which are not subject to any 
criteria that would imply short-term holding periods. Accordingly, higher amounts of 
financial instruments remain in a bank’s fair value option and available-for-sale 
portfolio over periods exceeding one financial year, whereas the held-for-trading 
portfolio composition is prone to significant and frequent changes from one financial 
year to another. Thus, auditing fair values differs between the categories in that the 
audit of fair value option and available-for-sale instruments benefits from prior period 
audit evidence which merely needs to be updated, while bigger parts of the held-for-
trading instruments, i.e. fair values, are audited for the first time.8 Consequentially, 
audit effort is higher for the latter category. We expect these higher levels of audit effort 
to translate into higher levels of audit fees. 
                                                
7 We note that this does not necessarily apply to derivatives that are categorized as held for trading. 
8 Moreover, the auditor additionally has to check whether the categorization as held for trading is correct 
in the first place which also increases audit effort for these first-time audited instruments. 
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The available-for-sale category differs from the other fair value categories in that here 
fair value gains or losses are directly recognized in the equity reserve through the other 
comprehensive income (IAS 39 par. 46 in conjunction with IAS 39 par. 55(b)). In their 
experiments with audit partners, Libby et al. (2006) find that auditors exhibit higher 
misstatement tolerance for disclosed than for recognized amounts. Also, their debriefing 
data suggest that partners view recognized misstatements as more material than 
disclosed ones. The authors argue this is due to the fact that disclosed amounts receive 
less attention from users and they are not as often used for contracting. Hypothesizing 
that similar differences exist between amounts that are recognized in the income 
statement and those that are recognized in the equity reserve leads to the expectation 
that auditors put less effort into auditing available-for-sale than held-for-trading and fair 
value option fair values, which results in higher audit fees regarding the latter 
categories.9  
As was shown above, we expect the peculiarities of the fair value financial instrument 
categories to induce differences regarding the audit effort and hence audit fees, 
therefore we state the following hypothesis in the alternative form: 
H3a: The influence of financial instruments at fair value on audit fees differs 
between the different financial instrument categories. 
Some recent studies examine the reclassification behavior of IFRS reporting banks 
under the IAS 39 amendment (e.g., Bischof et al., 2011) and the capital market 
participants’ reaction to said reclassifications (e.g., Paananen et al., 2012; Schneider, 
2012). The outcomes of the former studies suggest that the reclassifications were carried 
out for earnings and capital management purposes (e.g., Bischof et al., 2011; Fiechter, 
2011a). Also, prior research documents a positive relationship between earnings 
management and audit fees, whereby the authors measure earnings management by 
abnormal or discretionary accruals (accrual-based earnings management) (e.g., Gul et 
al., 2003; Antle et al., 2006; Caramanis and Lennox, 2008; Alali, 2011).10 Gul et al. 
(2003) argue that earnings management in the form of discretionary accruals increases 
                                                
9 On the other hand, studies show that unrealized available-for-sale fair value gains or losses are value 
relevant to investors (e.g., Kanagaretnam et al., 2009) which contradicts the assumption that these equity 
reserve amounts receive less attention from users and hence auditors. 
10 In their analysis of engagement partners’ client risk assessment documents Bedard and Johnstone 
(2004) find that auditors’ pricing increases with the earnings manipulation risk. Among other factors the 
earnings manipulation risk is proxied by unusually aggressive and creative accounting practices. 
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the auditor’s assessment of client risk, which in turn increases audit fees. Assuming that 
the same logic applies to earnings management in the form of reclassifications leads to 
the prediction that audit fees are higher for reclassifying banks than for other banks. 
However, it has to be noted that other studies document a negative relationship between 
audit fees and accruals (e.g., Larcker and Richardson, 2004).11  
In addition to the earnings management implications, we argue that reclassifications 
induce considerable audit effort per se. In the first instance, certain criteria have to be 
met in order to carry out such reclassifications under the IAS 39 amendment. For 
example, if the entity reclassifies a held-for-trading asset into the held-to-maturity 
category it has to document that the asset is not a derivative financial instrument (IAS 
39.50(a)), it is no longer held for the purpose of selling it in the near term (IAS 
39.50(c)), “rare circumstances” are present (IAS 39.50B), and that the entity has the 
intention and ability to hold the financial instrument until its maturity (IAS 39.9). The 
auditor then has to check whether the entity complies with these requirements. In the 
next step, two fair values have to be audited for each reclassified financial instrument: 
The fair value on the date of the reclassification which becomes the financial 
instrument’s new amortized cost (IAS 39.50C) as well as the fair value at the end of the 
financial year which has to be disclosed according to IFRS 7.12A(b). Additionally, 
other required disclosures have to be audited such as the fair value gain or loss that 
would have been recognized if the financial asset had not been reclassified (IFRS 
7.12A(e)). Hence, reclassifications induce a considerable number of audit procedures. 
Moreover, due to the exceptional nature of the reclassifications it is rather difficult and 
inexpedient to establish a regular process including appropriate controls, which in turn 
means that the audit procedures have to be of a substantive nature instead of generally 
less costly controls testing procedures. Finally, the experience of banks and even 
auditors regarding reclassifications is quite limited since these reclassification were 
possible for the first time in the financial year 2008. We assume that this additionally 
increases audit effort and therefore audit fees. Taken together, these observations lead to 
the following hypothesis (stated in the alternative form): 
                                                
11 Unlike Gul et al. (2003), Larcker and Richardson (2004) as well as Antle et al. (2006) regard the 
accruals as a function of audit fees and not vice versa. The rationale behind this approach is that high fees 
received by the auditor undermine the independence and provide incentives for less strict auditing which 
in turn increases earnings management in the form of accruals. 
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H3b: Audit fees are higher for banks that carry out reclassifications under the 
amendment to IAS 39. 
4. Research design 
We follow prior research on the determinants of audit fees by using the natural 
logarithm of total audit fees (LogAUDFEE) as the dependent variable in our models 
(Hay et al., 2006). Consistent with the extant literature, we include two groups of 
control variables to isolate the effect of our fair value variables on audit fees: general 
determinants of audit fees and those specifically related to banks (Chen et al., 2010; 
Ettredge et al., 2011). Regarding the former, we account for client size, client risk, and 
client complexity as primary audit fee determinants,12 while additionally controlling for 
strategic pricing behavior and cross-country differences. 
In order to control for client size, we include the natural logarithm of total assets LogTA 
(Simunic, 1980). LOSS, which is an indicator variable that equals one if the profit 
before tax is negative and zero otherwise,13 as well as the standard deviation of the 
bank's stock returns measured over the 12 month preceding fiscal year end (STDRET) 
are used as controls for client risk.14 We expect positive signs for LogTA, LOSS and 
STDRET. COMBANK is an indicator variable that equals one if the bank is classified as 
“Commercial Bank” according to the Global Industry Classification Standard (GICS 
Code 401010). These are institutions “whose businesses are derived primarily from 
commercial lending operations and have significant business activity in retail banking 
and small and medium corporate lending” (Standard & Poor’s and MSCI, 2010, p. 37). 
Banks with other GICS classifications, e.g. “Investment Banking & Brokerage” or 
“Diversified Capital Markets”, represent more complex banks and/or banks where the 
                                                
12 See section 3. 
13 Previous research (e.g., Goncharov et al., 2013) also uses a binary variable which equals one if the 
auditee received a qualified audit opinion and zero otherwise to proxy for financial distress. However, we 
do not use this control in our setting since all of our observations received unqualified audit opinions. 
14 Alternatively, we use the bank’s long term issuer rating by Fitch, Moody’s or Standard & Poor’s (in 
this order based on availability) obtained from Reuters CreditViews as risk control. We define six values 
for our variable RATING: A value of one is assigned to those observations with the best ratings in our 
sample, i.e. AA and AA- for Fitch and Standard & Poor’s or Aa2 and Aa3 for Moody’s, a value of six is 
assigned to those observations with the worst ratings, i.e. B for Fitch and Standard & Poor’s or B2 for 
Moody’s. Values two to five are assigned accordingly (see Ashbaugh-Skaife et al. (2006) who use a 
similar credit rating classification). We expect a positive sign for the estimated coefficient on RATING. 
However, while RATING is not statisitically significant in any of our estimated models, the results 
regarding the variables of interest remain qualitatively unchanged. Due to a lack of long term issuer rating 
data for several observations, the models using RATING instead of STDRET are estimated for a sample of 
165 observations. 
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auditor needs a higher specialization, both leading to higher audit fees. Accordingly, we 
expect a negative sign for COMBANK. 
Regarding strategic pricing behavior, Fields et al. (2004) show that audit fees 
experience a discount for banks with large demands for non-audit services. Therefore, 
we include the relation of non-audit fees to audit fees (NONAUDIT) in our models. 
Several studies (e.g., Deis and Giroux, 1996) provide evidence that audit fees decrease 
after a change of auditor. We use the indicator variable AUDITSWITCH, which equals 
one if the bank switched its auditor and zero otherwise, to control for this effect. We 
expect negative signs for NONAUDIT and AUDITSWITCH. Previous research 
documents that audit fees are significantly higher for entities that are audited by one of 
the Big 4 firms (Hay et al., 2006). However, more than 98 percent of the banks in our 
final sample are audited by at least one of the Big 4 firms. This means that a Big 4 
variable exhibits almost no variance at all, rendering it insignificant for the explanation 
of audit fees. Therefore, we abstain from explicitly including this variable in the models 
presented in this paper. 
In order to control for cross-country differences, we include REGQUAL, which equals 
the respective country’s Regulatory Quality variable value from Kaufmann et al. (2009). 
This variable captures a government’s ability to formulate and implement sound 
policies and regulations. REGQUAL also serves as a country variable controlling for 
differences that stem from country-specific auditing oversight models and strength of 
sanctions (Maijoor and Vanstraelen, 2012).15 Furthermore, we use CPL to control for 
differences in price levels across different countries, which are likely to exhibit an 
influence on the pricing of audit services. CPL equals the respective country’s 
comparative price level as published by the European Union. It is defined as the ratio of 
purchasing power parities to market exchange rates in each country. The data is then 
expressed in relation to EU-27, where EU-27 equals 100 and countries with values 
above (below) 100 are comparably expensive (inexpensive). We expect the relationship 
between audit fees and CPL to be of a positive nature.  
                                                
15 However, since we exclusively regard audit fees as our dependent variable we do not expect varying 
country-specific regulatory requirements to exhibit a strong influence on our dependent variable. These 
peculiarities are rather reflected in our non-audit fee variable, such as fees for so-called “other attestation 
services”. 
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Similar to the Fields et al. (2004) banking industry audit fee model we next include 
control variables capturing bank-specific risk categories, namely credit, capital, 
liquidity, operational, and market risk.16 We assume the general hypothesis that audit 
fees increase with an increase of said risks. Due to differences regarding data 
availability and institutional environments, we create, if necessary, variables different 
from those employed by Fields et al. (2004) or slightly modify the definitions.  
NONPERFORM and CHGOFF are our proxies for credit risk. NONPERFORM denotes 
the relationship of gross impaired loans to gross loans.17 According to IFRS 7.37(b) 
banks have to disclose loans that are individually determined to be impaired, therefore 
we use these disclosures to arrive at the numerator for the calculation of 
NONPERFORM.18 CHGOFF is defined as net charge-offs in relation to loan loss 
provision. We expect positive signs for both credit risk variables.  
Consistent with Fields et al. (2004), we proxy banks’ capital risk by including the 
variables CAPRATIO and INTANG. We do not have a clear prediction for the sign of 
CAPRATIO, which presents the Basel II total capital ratio with a minimum requirement 
of 8 percent (Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, 2004). Generally, the capital 
risk is decreasing with an increasing total capital ratio. Accordingly, we would expect a 
negative sign for CAPRATIO. Moreover, CAPRATIO does not only serve as a proxy for 
capital risk but also for credit and operational risk. Increasing levels of credit and/or 
operational risk increase the value of risk-weighted assets, which results, ceteris 
paribus, in a lower CAPRATIO. However, there are also cases where regulatory 
authorities demand total capital ratios above the minimum requirement of 8 percent due 
to high risk profiles or in order to sanction non-compliance with regulatory 
requirements according to article 136 of the Directive 2006/48/EC (European 
Commission, 2006b). Here, the capital risk is increasing with an increasing capital ratio. 
                                                
16 Fields et al. (2004) also point out that proxies for these risks are likely to proxy for client complexity at 
the same time. 
17 We exclude loans that are designated as at fair value through profit or loss as well as loans that are held 
for trading and available for sale since these are accounted for at fair value. Contrary to the IAS 39 
incurred loan loss approach which is applied to loans at amortized cost, fair value accounting under IAS 
39 additionally considers expected loan losses (Gebhardt and Novotny-Farkas, 2011). Moreover, fair 
value changes of loans are recognized in net income (equity for AFS financial instruments) without 
building a loan loss provision. 
18 However, for a total of 12 observations the banks’ disclosures do not allow for a clear separation 
regarding loans that are individually determined to be impaired and loans that are determined to be 
impaired on a portfolio basis. In order to maximize statistical power we do not exclude these observations 
from our analysis. However, the results do not change qualitatively when excluding these 12 
observations. 
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INTANG represents the proportion of intangible assets to total assets. As Fields et al. 
(2004) explain, a bank’s level of complexity and risk taking is positively correlated with 
the relative amount of intangible assets, especially goodwill. Moreover, intangible 
assets are deducted from regulatory capital as recommended by par. 689(ii) of the Basel 
II framework (Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, 2004). For both reasons we 
predict a positive sign for INTANG.  
Next, we proxy banks’ liquidity risk with the variable LIQUID by making use of the 
liquidity risk disclosures required under IFRS 7. According to IFRS 7.39 (a) and (b) in 
conjunction with IFRS 7 B11D, banks have to disclose a maturity analysis of 
undiscounted contractual cash flows for financial liabilities. Since IFRS 7.39 (a) and (b) 
in conjunction with IFRS 7 B11 leaves the determination of appropriate time bands to 
the entities’ judgment, we observe very heterogeneous disclosures in this regard. 
However, to consistently differentiate between short- and long-term financial liabilities 
throughout our observations, we define liabilities with a maturity of more than one year 
as long-term, since data for all observations allow for this differentiation. By calculating 
LIQUID as the relationship of liabilities with a maturity of less than one year to those 
with a maturity of more than one year we create a measure of liquidity risk: The higher 
this relationship, the higher the short-term need for liquidity and refinancing. We 
therefore expect a positive relationship between LIQUID and LogAUDFEE. We are 
aware that our liquidity proxy is incomplete as it ignores the assets side, which is due to 
restrictions of the empirical data. Since IFRS 7 requires banks to disclose a maturity 
analysis only for financial liabilities but not for financial assets, a rather small number 
of banks actually discloses this information on a voluntarily basis. We nevertheless 
collected the financial assets’ maturity analysis information for those cases where it is 
disclosed. However, calculating the liquidity proxy by including assets’ maturity 
information would consequentially lead to a reduced sample of 154 observations. In 
order to maximize statistical power for the models overall, we therefore decide to 
calculate our liquidity proxy with the liabilities information exclusively. Also, some 
banks disclose undiscounted contractual cash flows for financial liabilities, while others 
disclose a maturity analysis for balance sheet values or even for both types of values.19 
If both types are disclosed, we use the undiscounted contractual cash flows to calculate 
                                                
19 Due to these heterogeneous disclosures, we exclusively regard on-balance sheet liabilities since 
disclosures regarding the maturity of off-balance sheet liabilities is even more heterogeneous. 
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LIQUID. However, as a sensitivity test, we alternatively use the balance sheet values for 
those cases, which does not qualitatively alter the results.  
We proxy banks’ operating risk with an efficiency measure. However, while Fields et 
al. (2004) calculate their efficiency ratio as operating expenses to total income, we 
deflate personnel expenses by total assets to arrive at EFFIC. Since the majority of our 
sample banks does neither present the measure operating expenses nor total income in 
their profit or loss statements we use personnel expenses and total assets instead of 
manually constructing the former measures, which would require rather strong 
assumptions. The main rationale behind the efficiency measure of Fields et al. (2004) 
also applies to our proxy: High relative levels of personnel expenses indicate a lower 
efficiency and render it more difficult to arrive at a profit. Also, we expect EFFIC to be 
positively correlated with the complexity of banks’ business model. Consequentially, 
we predict a positive relationship for EFFIC and LogAUDFEE. 
Following Fields et al. (2004), we choose interest rate risk as our proxy for banks’ 
market risk. According to IFRS 7.40-41, banks are required to disclose sensitivity 
analyses for their different types of relevant market risks. The disclosures of our sample 
banks show a very heterogeneous picture in this regard.20 While a lot of banks use 
value-at-risk, these sensitivity analyses differ in their respective confidence levels, the 
assumed holding period and the underlying simulation models, which renders these 
disclosures futile for the purpose of our study. Other banks disclose their level of 
interest rate risk exposure by providing a gap analysis. However, since too few banks in 
our sample actually do so we construct an interest rate risk proxy of our own, i.e. the 
relationship of interest rate-sensitive assets to interest rate-sensitive liabilities 
(SENSITIVE). We consider financial instruments of the categories loans and receivables 
as well as held-to-maturity financial instruments as interest rate-sensitive assets whereas 
due to banks, due to customers, issued debt as well as subordinated debt represent 
interest-rate sensitive liabilities.21 Since market interest rates were generally falling 
                                                
20 The issue of heterogeneous banks’ risk disclosures is a very relevant and timely one. In May 2012 the 
Financial Stability Board created the Enhanced Disclosures Task Force (2012) which then issued a report 
titled “Enhancing the Risk Disclosures of Banks” in October 2012. This report contains explicit 
recommendations on liquidity, funding as well as market risk disclosures. 
21 We are aware that our approach is not consistent with and inferior to the repricing gap method used in 
risk management literature to measure interest rate risk. Here, assets or liabilities are referred to as being 
interest rate sensitive when they are repriced at or near market interest rates within a maturity bucket 
(Saunders and Cornett, 2011). However, as mentioned above, due to a lack of adequate data it is not 
possible to construct a variable based on this method for our analysis. 
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during 2009 and 2010 interest rate risk was decreasing with the proportion of interest 
rate-sensitive assets to interest rate-sensitive liabilities. Consequentially, we predict the 
relationship between LogAUDFEE and SENSITIVE to be of a negative nature. We 
acknowledge that SENSITIVE represents a rather weak proxy for market risk but due to 
the lack of more adequate empirical data the alternative would be to calculate the 
models without controlling for market risk at all.  
In sum, this leads to the following model, which we complete with the fair value 
variables employed to test our hypotheses: 
 LogAUDFEEt,i = β0 + β1LogTAt,i + β2LOSSt,i + β3STDRETt,i + β4NONAUDITt,i  
+ β5AUDSWITCHt,i + β6COMBANKt,i + β7REGQUALt,i + β8CPLt,i + β9NONPERFORMt,i  
+ β10CHGOFFt,i + β11CAPRATIOt,i + β12INTANGt,i + β13LIQUIDt,i + β14EFFICt,i  
+ β15SENSITIVEt,i  + β16Y10i  + Σβk  FV-VARIABLES + εt,I            (1) 
, where all variables except for the fair value variables are previously defined. 
In order to test our hypothesis H1a, i.e. whether audit fees increase with the number of 
different fair value categories, we construct CATEG. The value of this variable 
corresponds to the number of fair value categories (available-for-sale assets, fair value 
option assets / liabilities, held for trading assets / liabilities) used by the respective 
bank.22 We next include the proportion of fair value instruments to total assets to test 
their influence on audit fees (H1b). Due to high correlations, which might lead to 
multicollinearity problems,23 we run the models separately for fair value assets (FVA) 
and liabilities (FVL) rather than together in one model specification.24  
As elaborated in the hypotheses development, the verifiability (complexity) of fair 
values decreases (increases) from level one to three. We therefore partition FVA and 
FVL according to the three levels of inputs used to determine the fair values, which 
leads to the variables of interest FVA1, FVA2, and FVA3 as well as FVL1, FVL2, and 
FVL3. Including these variables in our model allows us to test H2. We alternatively 
partition FVA and FVL according to the IAS 39 fair value categories, i.e. available-for-
sale assets (AFS), fair value option assets (FVOA) / liabilities (FVOL) and held-for-
                                                
22 Since we regard CATEG also as a proxy for complexity, we keep this variable in all following model 
specifications. 
23 Pearson (Spearman) correlation between FVA und FVL is 0.6887 (0.5575) (see Table 4). 
24 The same applies to all other models where the variables of interest contain fair value financial 
instruments deflated by total assets. 
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trading assets (HFTA) / liabilities (HFTL). These fair value variables are added in order 
to test for H3a. 
To further strengthen the robustness of our results, we employ an indicator variable that 
equals one if the respective proportion of fair value instruments to total assets is higher 
than the sample median (FVAMedian, FVLMedian, FVA1Median, FVA2Median, 
FVA3Median, FVL1Median, FVL2Median,, FVL3Median, AFSMedian, FVOAMedian, 
HFTAMedian, FVOLMedian, HFTLMedian). Following Goncharov et al. (2013), we 
additionally calculate our fair value variables of interest as indicator variables that equal 
one if the proportion is higher than the sample mean (FVAMean, FVLMean, 
FVA1Mean, FVA2Mean, FVA3Mean, FVL1Mean, FVL2Mean, FVL3Mean, AFSMean, 
FVOAMean, HFTAMean, FVOLMean, HFTLMean). For brevity reasons, we do not 
tabulate the results of the models with Mean variables in the tables but report them in 
footnotes to the text. 
Finally, we include the indicator variable RECLASS, which equals one if the bank 
carried out reclassifications under the amendment to IAS 39 during the financial year 
(H3b). We follow Rogers (1993) by running all our OLS regressions models with 
heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors clustered by bank.  
5. Sample Description 
5.1 Sample Selection 
We run queries in the databases Bankscope and Datastream to identify European banks 
that prepared their consolidated financial statements for the years 2009 and 2010 under 
IFRS.25 From the resulting list we exclude all banks that are subsidiaries of other banks 
present in the sample, for which no annual report could be found on the banks’ 
homepage in the English, German or French language and those that were not publicly 
traded on at least one European stock exchange or went out of existence by the end of 
the financial year 2009. This proceeding yields a sample of 183 different banks before 
data collection. Having hand collected the audit fee data, 43 banks are identified that do 
not disclose audit fee information, which results in a sample of 140 different banks with 
280 potential firm-years observations for the time period under review, i.e. 2009-2010. 
Due to insufficient data concerning the variables calculation, we arrive at a number of 
                                                
25 Our sample selection starts with the financial year 2009 since this is the first year where entities are 
required to provide far value hierarchy level information.  
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201 firm-year observations that originate from 114 different banks. Table 1 illustrates 
the sample selection process in more detail. 
[Insert Table 1 here] 
Share price related information is obtained from Datastream while the Global Industry 
Classification Standard (GICS Code 401010) is collected from the database Reuters 
CreditViews. All other data used for the calculation of the variables in the main 
analyses are hand-collected from the annual reports.26 All amounts that relate to 
accounting and audit fee data are translated into Euros by using exchange rates from 
oanda.com applicable to the respective reporting date. 
5.2 Descriptive Statistics 
Table 2 reports the sample distribution by country for both years 2009 and 2010. 
[Insert Table 2 here] 
With a number of 28 observations (15 in 2009 and 13 in 2010) Italy represents the 
country with the highest number of observations followed by Norway (20 observations 
in total) and Germany (18 observations in total). With the exceptions of Norway and 
Switzerland all countries are members of the European Union. 
Table 3 presents descriptive statistics of the variables used in our analysis.  
[Insert Table 3 here] 
On average, 13 percent of our observations report a negative profit before tax, 3 percent 
switched their auditor and 78 percent are classified as Commercial Banks. The average 
relation of non-audit fees to audit fees is 0.67. The mean of NONPERFORM suggests 
that, on average, non-performing loans make up 6 percent of gross loans while the net 
charge-offs constitute 40 percent of the loan loss provision. The median of 5 for CATEG 
shows that more than 50 percent of the observations use all five categories of fair value 
financial instruments. On average, financial assets (liabilities) that are measured at fair 
value represent 24 (11) percent of total assets. With a mean value of 10 (6) percent 
financial assets (liabilities) held for trading is the most extensively used fair value 
                                                
26 Where possible, we collected 2009 data as „previous year data“ from the respective 2010 annual 
reports due to hand-collection costs. The accounting data used for the treatment effects model probit 
regression (section 6.4) are obtained from Worldscope. 
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category on the assets and liabilities side. When splitting the fair value instruments 
according to the three fair value levels it shows that most assets’ fair values are 
determined on the basis of level 1 inputs (12 percent of total assets). The most common 
input level on the liabilities side is level 2. Here, liabilities’ fair values determined on 
the basis of level 2 inputs represent 9 percent of total assets. Reclassifications were 
carried out by 14 percent of the observations.  
Table 4 shows Pearson and Spearman correlations among the variables. 
[Insert Table 4 here] 
When regarding the general control variables both Pearson and Spearman correlations 
indicate with statistical significance the predicted relationships between LogAUDFEE 
and LogTA, STDRET, AUDSWITCH, as well as REGQUAL. The univariate evidence for 
the correlations of the bank risk-specific variables and LogAUDFEE is mixed. While 
Spearman and Pearson correlations are significant for CHGOFF, INTANG, and 
SENSITIVE and in line with the predictions made, the correlations for NONPERFORM 
and EFFIC are not. H1a is supported by the univariate results since both Pearson and 
Spearman correlations for CATEG strongly suggest that audit fees are positively 
correlated with the number of financial instrument categories. The same holds for the 
total assets deflated fair value exposure on the assets (FVA) and on the liabilities (FVL) 
side (H1b). When regarding fair value levels of financial assets (liabilities), the 
relationship is most pronounced for LogAUDFEE and FVA2 (FVL3), which lends some 
support to H2, i.e. that the influence of financial instruments at fair value on audit fees 
is more pronounced for less verifiable fair values. The partitioning according to the 
financial instrument categories shows that for assets and liabilities held-for-trading 
financial instruments exhibit the strongest influence on audit fees, which is line with the 
predictions made under H3a. Also, univariate evidence suggests that audit fees are 
higher for banks that carried out IAS 39 reclassifications during the current financial 
year (H3b) since RECLASS is positively correlated with LogAUDFEE. 
When regarding correlations between the independent variables both Spearman and 
Pearson correlations indicate high correlations between FVA and FVL, FVOA and 
FVOL, HFTA and HFTL as well as FVA2 and FVL2. We do not include assets and 
liabilities side fair value instruments in the same models exactly due to these anticipated 
high correlations, which allows us to avoid potential multicollinearity problems. 
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Correlations between the other independent variables of the same models are small to 
moderate with two exceptions. These two exceptions concern the Pearson correlation 
between LogTA and HFTL (0.7112) as well as the Spearman correlation between 
SENSITIVE and FVA (-0.6457).27   
6. Results 
6.1 Determinants of banks’ audit fees and the influence of fair values 
Table 5 presents OLS regression results on the determinants of banks’ audit fees and the 
influence of total fair value assets and liabilities. 
[Insert Table 5 here] 
First, we estimate our base model (1). With the exception of CPL the estimated 
coefficients of all general, i.e. not bank-specific, control variables are in line with the 
predictions. For LogTA (0.826; t-statistic = 24.40), STDRET (7.231; t-statistic = 2.12), 
NONAUDIT (-0.280; t-statistic = -3.11), COMBANK (-0.410; t-statistic = -2.10), and 
REGQUAL (0.577; t-statistic = 2.28), the coefficients are statistically significant at the 
one and five percent level respectively, they lack statistical significance for LOSS 
(0.199; t-statistic = 1.35), AUDSWITCH (-0.087; t-statistic =  
-0.35), and CPL (-0.001; t-statistic = -0.30). Besides the strong influence exhibited by 
total assets we want to highlight the highly significant result regarding NONAUDIT. 
This result indicates that audit firms offer discounts on their audit fees in return for a 
high client demand of non-audit services. These strategic considerations might be 
detrimental to the formation of adequate audit fees, i.e. fees that reflect the risk and 
complexity of the client. 
With regard to our bank-specific credit risk variables, we find that the estimated 
coefficient of NONPERFORM (0.381; t-statistic = 0.29) lacks significance, while it is 
statistically significant for CHGOFF but does not possess the predicted sign (-0.669; t-
statistic = -2.70). We interpret these findings as evidence that auditors do not put much 
emphasis on credit risk when pricing their services. However, we cannot provide a 
reasonable explanation of why audit fees would decrease with an increase of CHGOFF. 
Also, the estimated coefficients for both our capital risk variables CAPRATIO (0.003; t-
                                                
27 Further analyses reveal that the alternative exclusion of these variables does not change the results 
qualitatively. 
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statistic = 0.13) and INTANG (6.240; t-statistic = 1.28) are not statistically significant. 
As mentioned above, CAPRATIO also serves as a proxy for credit risk. Thus, the fact 
that CAPRATIO does not exhibit any statistically significant influence on audit fees 
again suggests that auditors do not adequately factor credit risk into their audit fee 
function. In contrast, the results on LIQUID (0.001; t-statistic = 3.24) and EFFIC 
(22.413; t-statistic = 2.84) indicate at the one percent significance level that audit fees 
increase in the level of liquidity risk and operational risk. Finally, our base model does 
not find any statistical significant evidence for an influence of our interest rate risk 
variable SENSITIVE (-0.338; t-statistic = -1.17) on audit fees. Taken together, the base 
model results suggest that the bank-specific risk variables play an inferior role in the 
pricing of audit services when compared to more general, i.e. not bank-specific, 
variables that control for size, risk, complexity and non-audit fees. The adjusted R-
squared of 88.88 percent is quite high and comparable to the values originated by 
previous studies (e.g., Ettredge et al., 2011). 
In order to test our hypothesis H1a, we include CATEG in model (2). The results on 
CATEG (0.255; t-statistic = 3.69) strongly support H1a: The positive and highly 
statistically significant estimated coefficient indicates that audit fees increase with the 
number of different fair value categories employed by a bank.28  
We next test whether audit fees are higher for banks with a higher proportion of 
financial instruments at fair value (hypothesis H1b) by including FVA in model (3a) and 
FVL in model (4a). The results on both fair value variables do not lend support to H1b 
since both FVA (-0.470; t-statistic = -1.18) and FVL (0.131; t-statistic = 0.24) lack 
statistical significance. The same holds when using FVAMedian (-0.071; t-statistic = -
0.48) instead of FVA in model (3b) and FVLMedian (-0.061; t-statistic = -0.51) in 
model (4b).29 In sum, we note that fair value exposure measured as the number of 
employed IAS 39 fair value categories exhibits an influence on audit fees, while the 
exposure measured as the relative amount of fair value financial instruments does not. 
                                                
28 The result regarding H1a is robust throughout our analyses since the estimated positive coefficient on 
CATEG is significant at the one percent level in all of our models. 
29 Untabulated results for FVAMean (-0.225; t-statistic = -1.66) and FVLMean (0.009; t-statistic = 0.05) 
do not change these inferences qualitatively. 
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Next, we analyze whether a more differentiated approach regarding the nature of fair 
values changes the latter result. Therefore, we partition FVA and FVL according to the 
respective fair value level inputs used in determining the fair values.  
[Insert Table 6 here] 
Model (5a) includes the assets side fair value variables in order to test H2, i.e. whether 
the influence of fair values on audit fees is more pronounced for less verifiable and 
more complex fair values. The estimated coefficient on FVA3 (0.927; t-statistic = 0.33) 
actually is positive as opposed to FVA1 (-0.181; t-statistic = -0.38) and FVA2 (-0.829; t-
statistic = -1.40), which suggests that audit fees increase exclusively with less verifiable 
and more complex level 3 fair value assets. However, the coefficients all lack statistical 
significance. When alternatively approximating the three level exposures with the 
Median variables we find that the estimated positive coefficient of FVA3Median (0.321; 
t-statistic = 2.76) is significant at the one percent level while FVA1Median and 
FVA2Median still lack significance. These findings support H2.30 
Regarding the liabilities side, the results of model (6a) also lend support to H2: FVL1 
and FVL2 both do not exhibit any statistically significant influence on audit fees as 
opposed to level 3 fair value financial liabilities FVL3 (18.856; t-statistic = 2.21). When 
alternatively approximating the exposures, we do not find statistically significant 
evidence in favor of H2 since although the estimated coefficient on FVL3Median is the 
only one with a positive sign, all Median variables lack significance in model (6b).31  
In sum, we regard our overall findings as evidence that the influence of fair values on 
audit fees increases with a decreasing verifiability and increasing complexity of these 
fair values. 
As described in section 4, we next partition FVA and FVL according to the IAS 39 fair 
value categories to examine whether the influence of fair values on audit fees differs 
due to the peculiarities of these categories (H3a). Table 7 presents the results of the 
assets and liabilities side models (7a-b) and (8a-b): 
[Insert Table 7 here] 
                                                
30 The same inference can be drawn from the untabulated results for FVA3Mean (0.297; t-statistic = 2.14), 
where FVA1Mean and FVA2Mean also lack statistical significance. 
31 The same holds when using Mean variables. 
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While in model (7a) neither the estimated coefficient on AFS (-0.238; t-statistic = -0.25) 
nor on HFTA (0.183; t-statistic = 0.33) exhibits statistically significant influence on 
audit fees, we detect a marginally significant negative influence regarding FVOA (-
0.947; t-statistic = -1.95). However, we do not put much emphasis on this marginally 
significant result because both alternative approximations of the fair value option 
exposure FVOAMedian (-0.093; t-statistic = -0.80) and FVOAMean (-0.209; t-statistic = 
-1.60) fail to provide statistically significant evidence for a negative relationship 
between fair value option assets and audit fees. Taken together, the findings for the 
assets side do not suggest that the influence of fair value financial instruments on audit 
fees differs between the IAS 39 financial instrument categories. The same holds when 
regarding the liabilities side in models (8a) and (8b), where none of the estimated 
coefficients on FVOL, HFTL, FVOLMedian, and HFTLMedian are significant.32 
In order to analyze whether the influence of level 3 fair values differs between the IAS 
39 fair value categories, we partition them accordingly and estimate models (9) and 
(10).33  
[Insert Table 8 here] 
With regard to the assets side, model (9) fails to provide evidence for differences in the 
influence of level 3 assets on audit fees between IAS 39 categories. In contrast, the 
results of model (10) suggest that held-for-trading level 3 liabilities (HFTL3) exhibit an 
influence on audit fees (21.623; t-statistics = 1.85), while fair value option liabilities 
(FVOL3) do not. However, the results presented in Table 8 have to be interpreted 
cautiously due to the small number of observations with values different from zero 
regarding the variables of interest, ranging from 39 observations for FVOL3 to 133 
observations for AFS3.34 
Finally, we include RECLASS in our model in order to test for H3b with the results 
being reported in Table 9: 
[Insert Table 9 here] 
                                                
32 The results are also robust when using FVOLMean and HFTLMean.  
33 The total number of observations is reduced to 199 since for 2009 and 2010 Banco Santander discloses 
in its annual report only aggregated values for level 2 and 3 regarding financial instrument types. Also, 
we approximate the partition of level 3 fair value financial asset (liabilities) categories in 33 (2) cases 
since in these cases the information given in the annual reports is incomplete. 
34 This rather small number of observations with values different from zero regarding the variables of 
interest is also the reason why we do not calculate these models with median and mean values. 
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Here, the estimated coefficient on RECLASS (0.347; t-statistic = 2.79) is statistically 
significant at the one percent level, which strongly suggests that reclassifications under 
the IAS 39 amendment increase audit fees as hypothesized under H3b. 
6.2 Additional Analysis – Institutional Variables 
Following Kim et al. (2012), we use an alternative variable to control for regulatory 
strength and replace REGQUAL by ENFORCE, which equals the public enforcement 
index created by La Porta et al. (2006). While this reduces our observations to a total 
number of 181, ENFORCE does not exhibit any statistical significant influence on audit 
fees across all our models. The same holds when additionally including CIVILLAW, 
which equals one if the bank’s domicile country has a civil law legal origin. Civil law 
countries have weaker legal investor protection than common law countries (La Porta et 
al., 1998), which might have an influence on auditors’ litigation risk (Kim et al., 2012). 
We also follow Goncharov et al. (2013) and replace REGQUAL by the anti-self-dealing 
index (ANTISDI) from Djankov et al. (2008) to control for differences in legal 
protection and add the La Porta et al. (2006) liability standard index (LIABSTAN). The 
latter captures the procedural difficulty in recovering losses in a civil liability case. This 
proceeding yields a reduced sample size of 179. However, with the exception of a 
marginally significant negative estimated coefficient for LIABSTAN in one case, none of 
these variables exhibits any statistical significant influence on audit fees. 
We additionally control for cross-country differences regarding regulatory requirements 
that bank auditors have to adhere to. The underlying assumption is that with an increase 
of regulatory requirements also the auditor’s cost and litigation risk increase, which in 
turn increases audit fees. We make use of a database provided by The World Bank (see 
Barth et al. (2001) for an overview) in order to quantify country-specific regulatory 
requirements. This database covers information on bank regulation and supervisory 
across 101 countries, including data about country-specific external auditing 
requirements. The extent of these requirements is evaluated with a questionnaire that 
encompasses 11 questions (e.g. “Are external auditors legally required to report to the 
supervisory agency any other information discovered in an audit that could jeopardize 
the health of a bank?”). We construct an index that equals the sum of all questions 
answered with “yes”. The resulting country-specific values range from 0 to 11, whereby 
high values indicate high regulatory requirements. However, we do not find any 
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statistically significant influence of AUDITINDEX in our analyses. In summary, the 
results indicate that differences in the regulatory environment captured by variables 
other than REGQUAL do not exhibit any significant influence on audit fees. A possible 
explanation is that these differences are rather reflected in non-audit fees for other 
attestation services. 
We also use a more audit market-specific variable (AFPL) instead of CPL as an 
alternative control for country differences in price levels. AFPL equals the 2009 audit 
fee price levels published by the European Commission (European Commission, 2011) 
in a study on the European audit market. The audit fee price levels are calculated as 
average audit and audit-related fees paid by main index companies divided by the 
average turnover of these companies. Including AFPL in our models reduces the sample 
size to a number of 155, which is due to the fact that the audit market study only 
provides audit fee price levels for 19 countries. Similar to CPL none of the model 
estimations yields a statistically significant coefficient for AFPL. 
6.3 Robustness - France and Joint Audits 
Following Goncharov et al. (2013), we exclude our 8 French bank observations from 
the sample. The French audit market differs from other European countries in that more 
strict rules concerning, for instance, non-audit services are in place (Maijoor and 
Vanstraelen, 2012). Excluding French banks leads to some minor variations across the 
presented result of our models. Accordingly, the statistical significance of CHGOFF 
(-0.543; t-statistic = -2.30) in the base model (1) drops to the 5 percent level while the 
significance of the estimated coefficients on FVL3 (18.622; t-statistic = 1.97) in model 
(6a) decreases to the 10 percent level and on FVOA (-1.011; t-statistic = -2.07) in model 
(7a) increases to the 5 percent level. As already mentioned, we regard these as minor 
changes and since all other results remain qualitatively unchanged this further 
strengthens the robustness of our results overall. 
Another consideration is that the presence of a joint audit might exhibit an influence on 
audit fees. Maijoor and Vanstralen (2012) note that while currently the EC does not 
mandate joint audits, they were voluntarily established by some countries such as 
Denmark. Our sample comprises a total number of 17 joint audits. Consequentially, we 
add the control variable JOIAUD to our models, which equals one if the respective bank 
is jointly audited by more than one audit firm and zero otherwise. However, neither is 
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JOIAUD of statistical significance in any of the models nor do the results presented in 
the main analysis experience any qualitative changes.  
6.4 Treatment effects model for reclassification 
Banks individually decide whether to make use of IAS 39 reclassifications, which might 
lead to endogeneity concerns. In order to address these concerns, we follow prior 
literature (e.g., Leuz and Verrecchia, 2000; Fiechter, 2011b) by employing a two-stage 
treatment effects model (Heckman, 1979). Inspired by prior studies (Bischof et al., 
2011; Paananen et al., 2012) that identify determinants of the banks’ decision to 
reclassify, we run the following first stage probit regression:35  
 PR(RECLASS=1)t,i = β0 + β1MTBt,i + β2SMALL_PROFITt,i + β3ΔDEPOSITSt,i  
+ β4RISKt,i + β5RQt,i  + εt,I                (2) 
Market-to-book ratio (MTB) reflects the banks’ investment opportunities. Following 
Paananen et al. (2012), we predict a negative association, as banks with lower MTB 
ratios are stronger incentivized to communicate favorable signals. The authors also 
argue, that banks reporting small profits are more likely to be reclassifying banks. The 
variable SMALL_PROFIT takes the value of one if the bank’s net income, scaled by 
total assets at the beginning of the financial year, is smaller than 1% or equal to 0% 
(Cohen et al., 2008). In line with Paananen et al. (2012), we predict a positive sign for 
SMALL_PROFIT. Hypothesizing that banks, which are confronted with decreasing 
customer deposits are more prone to carry out reclassifications (Bischof et al., 2011), 
we predict a positive influence of ΔDEPOSITS. The latter variable equals one if the 
change in customer deposits between the current and the prior year is negative. The 
bank’s risk is captured by the inclusion of beta (RISK). As banks with larger risk are 
more inclined to decrease earnings volatility by reclassifications, we expect a positive 
sign for this coefficient (Paananen et al., 2012). Finally, RQ proxies the bank’s reporting 
quality, computed as the median ratio of annual accruals to cash flows from operations 
over the current and prior four financial years. Since Bischof et al. (2011) show that 
banks with lower values of RQ are more prone to carry out reclassifications, we expect 
a negative sign for the estimated coefficient of this variable. 
                                                
35 In contrast to our paper, the studies by Bischof et al. (2011) and Paananen et al. (2012) are set in the 
financial crisis year 2008. Therefore, we only use those determinants in the first stage which we consider 
relevant for our sample period and setting. 
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Panel A of Appendix 2 reports the results from the first stage regression.36 All 
independent variables turn out to be statistically significant and have the predicted 
signs. Panel B of Appendix 3 shows the results derived from the second stage regression 
including the inverse Mills ratio (IMR). The results are qualitatively unchanged, 
compared to the main analysis. Most importantly, RECLASS remains statistically 
significant indicating that our findings are not affected by endogeneity.  
6.5 Principal component factoring 
In our main analyses we regard five types of risk that are hypothesized to have an 
impact on audit fees in the banking industry. Also, we define seven different variables 
to proxy for said risk categories as well as two proxy variables capturing the variation in 
the institutional environments and price levels across countries. Since we use multiple 
variables for each type of risk as well as for the country-specific variations there might 
be potential overlaps across the risk categories and between the variables within these 
categories. Therefore, we employ a principal component analysis to address this issue. 
Following the Kaiser criterion we retain four factors with eigenvalues higher than one. 
Panel A of Appendix 3 reports the four associated scoring coefficients, which are based 
on varimax rotated factors. Factor one solely loads on REGQUAL and CPL, i.e. both 
country-specific variables. Factor two loads most strongly on INTANG and EFFIC, 
while factor three loads most heavily on CHGOFF and LIQUID. Our final factor 4 
loads exclusively on NONPERFORM. In sum, none of our proxy variables loads on 
more than one factor with SENSITIVE and CAPRATIO not loading on any of the four 
factors. Next, we rerun our main analysis replacing our individual risk and country-
specific proxies with the four factors. As reported in Panel B of Appendix 2, only 
factors one and two are significantly related to audit fees. The significance levels of all 
variables not involved in principal component factoring as well as the adjusted R-
squared are comparable to the model specifications of the main analysis. This also holds 
for all other models (untabulated). Overall, the factor analysis shows that the main 
analysis results are not affected by overlapping effects regarding our set of country-
specific and risk proxy variables. 
 
                                                
36 Compared to the main analysis, we lose two observations due to data unavailability, thus arriving at a 
total of 199.  
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7. Conclusion 
After controlling for general and bank-specific determinants of European IFRS banks’ 
audit fees, this paper analyzes whether and to what extent fair values and financial 
instrument reclassifications exhibit an influence on audit fees. To this end, we first 
introduce two dimensions of fair value exposure, namely the number of different IAS 
39 fair value financial instrument categories used by a bank and the proportion of fair 
value financial instruments to total assets. Our evidence consistently shows that the 
former exhibits a significant influence on audit fees since they increase with the number 
of categories. In contrast to existing studies set in a US banking environment, we do not 
find evidence suggesting that the deflated amount of fair valued assets or liabilities has 
an impact on audit fees. After having partitioned these amounts according to the three 
IAS 39 fair value levels, our results indicate that audit fees increase with more complex 
and less reliable level 3 assets and liabilities, which is in line with prior literature. 
Further analyses do not support the notion that the influence of fair values on audit fees 
varies between the different IAS 39 financial instrument categories. Finally, we find 
that banks which carry out financial instrument reclassifications under the IAS 39 
amendment exhibit higher audit fees than other banks. We attribute this finding to 
potential earnings management implications and the incremental audit effort induced by 
reclassifications. 
Overall, our findings demonstrate that fair value measurements are not associated per se 
with higher contracting costs, i.e. audit fees. Rather, a more differentiated view is 
required, as the nature of fair values measurements as well as certain audit mandate 
characteristics are of considerable importance in the determination process of audit fees 
and should therefore deserve special attention. This evidence adds to the ongoing debate 
on the pros and cons of fair value accounting with regard to its economic effects and 
may assist regulators as well as researchers interested in assessing and designing 
regulatory measures in the European bank audit market. One of the main limitations of 
our paper is the relatively small sample size. Other issues that have already been laid 
out in the research design section include the rather weak proxy variables for liquidity 
and market risk. However, we believe that these are the most suitable proxies available 
in light of the given bank disclosures.  
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Table 1: Sample selection 
 
146 
Table 2: Country statistics 
 
 
 
147 
Table 3: Descriptive statistics 
 
 
 Ta
bl
e 
4:
 C
or
re
la
tio
ns
 a
m
on
g 
va
ria
bl
es
 
 
 
 148 
 Ta
bl
e 
5:
 D
et
er
m
in
an
ts
 o
f b
an
ks
' a
ud
it 
fe
es
 a
nd
 th
e 
in
flu
en
ce
 o
f t
ot
al
 fa
ir 
va
lu
e 
as
se
ts
 a
nd
 li
ab
ili
tie
s  
 
 149 
 
150 
Table 6: Determinants of banks' audit fees and the influence of level 1-3 fair value 
assets and liabilities 
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Table 7: Determinants of banks' audit fees and the influence of fair value financial 
instrument categories 
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Table 8: Determinants of banks' audit fees and the influence of level 3 fair value 
financial instrument categories 
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Table 9: Determinants of banks' audit fees and the influence of IAS 39 reclassifications 
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Appendix 1: Definition of variables 
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Appendix 2: Treatment effects model and revised regression model 
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Appendix 3: Factor analysis and revised regression model 
 
